Last Friday and Saturday I participated in the first meeting of a new network of scholars interested in cultural diplomacy, organised by colleagues at the Universities of Bath and Swansea. The most exciting, and in many ways the most challenging, aspect of this meeting was its interdisciplinarity. After spending a week at the International Studies Association talking almost exclusively with colleagues working in public diplomacy from an international relations or international communications perspective, I was now discussing the subject with colleagues from area studies, cultural studies, linguistics and sociology. Needless to say we had some extremely interesting conversations which have helped me to understand better the cultural processes and products involved in cultural diplomacy. Not least was the challenge from some to define cultural diplomacy, and some arrived at the conclusion that definitions are not that important, and in fact can be restrictive. Also, where do cultural relations end, and cultural diplomacy begin?
In one of our breakout group meetings I raised the example of the current push in the UK to promote Shakespeare who, like Dickens at the start of the year, is now appearing like a rash across the Radio 4, BBC 2 and 3 schedules. I pose my questions here, but can offer no answers as these are 'thoughts in progress'. I would be delighted to see the opinions of those who read this blog.
The first question is about Shakespeare as a cultural diplomacy product. Why do we suppose that Shakespeare represents Britain (or, more specifically England), and who decides? Is this a particular view of British culture that only represents a part of the nation? For many of my neighbours on the working class council estate in Bradford where I grew up, Shakespeare does not represent their culture. So whose culture are we promoting, and why? Does this remain a class issue? Or educational? Or something else?
The second question arises from a colleague's response to these observations at Bath. Shakespeare is known throughout the world and is performed on a regular basis in foreign languages, with the drama localised for specific cultural settings. In other words, Shakespeare has been appropriated. What are the consequences of this for cultural diplomacy? Is there a point where the appropriation means dilution, and the original product becomes hidden, or even disappears altogether? Does it matter if some audiences watching a foreign language performance of Hamlet in some remote corner of the world have never heard of Shakespeare? If they cannot connect that performance to the UK, does it mean that Shakespeare has no cultural diplomacy relevance?
I will continue to ponder these questions, and I look forward to your comments.
Tuesday, 1 May 2012
Tuesday, 3 April 2012
Chinese soft power: Libya and Syria
I am currently attending the annual conference of the International Studies Association in San Diego. At the publishers' exhibition I picked up the February 27 issue (Number 152) of the Asia Pacific Bulletin published by the East-West Center (http://EastWestCenter.org/APB), 'Syria: What China has learned from its Libya experience' by Yun Sun.The author presents a very useful survey of China's involvement in the Middle East that is of interest to scholars of soft power. We know, for example, that China attracted a barrage of international criticism for its joint veto (with Russia) of a UN Security Council Resolution on Syria. It is important to note, however, that such behaviour is consistent with China's principle of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states, an approach to foreign policy that can be traced back to the 1949 revolution and which has only recently been challenged by more active involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. In other words, it is possible to argue that the decision to veto the Resolution demonstrates China's soft power in action, if by soft power we mean the projection of ideals and values a country upholds.
Yun Sun makes the point that China's decision on Syria was based on its experience of abstaining on the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 to approve NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. This abstention had actually undermined China's soft power at home ('domestic nationalists criticised Beijing for "compromising its principles" and "acquiescing to Western demands"') and abroad (' ... with some countries questioning the independence of China's foreign policy and its ability to handle Western pressure'). In other words, it is possible that China's decision to abstain in the vote on Libya damaged its soft power capacity: China's behaviour was not consistent with Chinese foreign policy values and principles. Moreover, China's soft power is now enhanced not only by attempts to engage with the Syrian opposition to the Assad regime (the Syrian National Committee met with the Chinese Foreign Minister on Africa and West Asia only 24 hours after the vote in the UN), but also by China's active search for a non-military solution to the Syrian problem. This is the kind of behaviour that can make a huge difference to China's ability to claim soft power capital.
Yun Sun makes the point that China's decision on Syria was based on its experience of abstaining on the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 to approve NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. This abstention had actually undermined China's soft power at home ('domestic nationalists criticised Beijing for "compromising its principles" and "acquiescing to Western demands"') and abroad (' ... with some countries questioning the independence of China's foreign policy and its ability to handle Western pressure'). In other words, it is possible that China's decision to abstain in the vote on Libya damaged its soft power capacity: China's behaviour was not consistent with Chinese foreign policy values and principles. Moreover, China's soft power is now enhanced not only by attempts to engage with the Syrian opposition to the Assad regime (the Syrian National Committee met with the Chinese Foreign Minister on Africa and West Asia only 24 hours after the vote in the UN), but also by China's active search for a non-military solution to the Syrian problem. This is the kind of behaviour that can make a huge difference to China's ability to claim soft power capital.
Sunday, 1 April 2012
The soft power of happiness
On Monday 2 April 2012, the UN will implement Resolution 65/39 which places 'happiness' officially on the global agenda. The Resolution also empowers the Kingdom of Bhutan to convene a meeting on happiness as part of the 66th session of the UN General Assembly, opened by Prince Charles. Joseph Stiglitz and Jeffrey Sachs will discuss 'happiness indicators'.
This is a major triumph for Bhutan's soft power. Forty years ago, the King of this nation established Gross National Happiness (GNH) as an alternative to Gross National Product (GNP). Although Bhutan is one of the least developed and poorest countries in the world, it has been described as the happiest nation in Asia and the eighth happiest in the world by Business Week. Conferences on GNH have taken place across the world, including Canada and the Netherlands, and high-profile economists like Amartya Sen and the French President have taken notice of how happiness can measure performance and progress.
I think this is an interesting development for two reasons and deserves greater attention.
First, it is an interesting measure of soft power. Happiness is a core value in Bhutan, and if soft power really does mean the attraction of national values and ideals, then perhaps happiness is something we now should consider alongside other such values as democracy, freedom etc, prosperity etc.
Second, the fact that GNH has been adopted by the UN, and that governments, policy-makers and policy-relevant thinkers are talking about happiness demonstrates the success of Bhutan's soft power capacity. Bhutan has been able to persuade the world over the last forty years that GNH is worth noticing. In studying soft power we become obsessed by measurement; can we find any credible and genuine proof that the soft power has worked? Perhaps in this case we can. Perhaps it reveals a deeper malaise: it is not so much the success of Bhutan's capacity to convince the world to measure happiness, but a failure of other, more conventional approaches to measuring progress that seem to be challenged by global recession, wars and man-made crises. Nevertheless, we have clear evidence here of parts of the world, and the UN, embracing the values of a small, poor, landlocked Himalayan kingdom that barely makes the news. This is a step forward. It has taken forty years, but this only demonstrates that persuasion is a long-term process and that soft power cannot expect results overnight.
All in all, I am happy.
This is a major triumph for Bhutan's soft power. Forty years ago, the King of this nation established Gross National Happiness (GNH) as an alternative to Gross National Product (GNP). Although Bhutan is one of the least developed and poorest countries in the world, it has been described as the happiest nation in Asia and the eighth happiest in the world by Business Week. Conferences on GNH have taken place across the world, including Canada and the Netherlands, and high-profile economists like Amartya Sen and the French President have taken notice of how happiness can measure performance and progress.
I think this is an interesting development for two reasons and deserves greater attention.
First, it is an interesting measure of soft power. Happiness is a core value in Bhutan, and if soft power really does mean the attraction of national values and ideals, then perhaps happiness is something we now should consider alongside other such values as democracy, freedom etc, prosperity etc.
Second, the fact that GNH has been adopted by the UN, and that governments, policy-makers and policy-relevant thinkers are talking about happiness demonstrates the success of Bhutan's soft power capacity. Bhutan has been able to persuade the world over the last forty years that GNH is worth noticing. In studying soft power we become obsessed by measurement; can we find any credible and genuine proof that the soft power has worked? Perhaps in this case we can. Perhaps it reveals a deeper malaise: it is not so much the success of Bhutan's capacity to convince the world to measure happiness, but a failure of other, more conventional approaches to measuring progress that seem to be challenged by global recession, wars and man-made crises. Nevertheless, we have clear evidence here of parts of the world, and the UN, embracing the values of a small, poor, landlocked Himalayan kingdom that barely makes the news. This is a step forward. It has taken forty years, but this only demonstrates that persuasion is a long-term process and that soft power cannot expect results overnight.
All in all, I am happy.
Thursday, 22 March 2012
Joseph Nye on China
I have just found this short clip of a lecture delivered by Joseph Nye in 2011.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RmW1gZPqFDs&feature=relmfu
I think that there are two problems with Professor Nye's ideas and these are issues that have troubled me since I have revisted his work for my current research. First, I do not understand why soft power has to be located within a competitive framework. Why should we be so concerned if China is 'catching up' with the US in soft power terms? Surely this is a mindset that feeds the irrational debates about the so-called 'China threat', when understanding the soft dimension of power is a way to circumvent such competitive inclinations. It also demonstrates that the de-Westernisation of soft power is an urgent issue, since this competitive frame is a consequence of understanding soft power via the Anglo-American approach.
Second, the clip demonstrates how confusing the whole idea of soft power really is. If soft power is an intangible, something that cannot be strategised and is ultimately a consequence of who you are and what you do, rather than what you say or what you claim to be, then such a worry about China 'catching up' is misplaced, as is a measurement of soft power based on quantifying and analysing such outputs as the number of Confucius Institutes, the number of TV stations broadcasting from China etc.
Professor Nye is correct, however, to identify the consequences of China's political decisions and actions on its soft power capacity; polls repeatedly show that the more China invests in soft power activities (and it is the highest spender in Asian on such activities) China's image has actually gone down. In other words, there is no clear correlation between investment in soft power and the capacity to persuade audiences to embrace a more positive image. Policy - who you are, what you do and what you stand for - will always be the most important consideration.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RmW1gZPqFDs&feature=relmfu
I think that there are two problems with Professor Nye's ideas and these are issues that have troubled me since I have revisted his work for my current research. First, I do not understand why soft power has to be located within a competitive framework. Why should we be so concerned if China is 'catching up' with the US in soft power terms? Surely this is a mindset that feeds the irrational debates about the so-called 'China threat', when understanding the soft dimension of power is a way to circumvent such competitive inclinations. It also demonstrates that the de-Westernisation of soft power is an urgent issue, since this competitive frame is a consequence of understanding soft power via the Anglo-American approach.
Second, the clip demonstrates how confusing the whole idea of soft power really is. If soft power is an intangible, something that cannot be strategised and is ultimately a consequence of who you are and what you do, rather than what you say or what you claim to be, then such a worry about China 'catching up' is misplaced, as is a measurement of soft power based on quantifying and analysing such outputs as the number of Confucius Institutes, the number of TV stations broadcasting from China etc.
Professor Nye is correct, however, to identify the consequences of China's political decisions and actions on its soft power capacity; polls repeatedly show that the more China invests in soft power activities (and it is the highest spender in Asian on such activities) China's image has actually gone down. In other words, there is no clear correlation between investment in soft power and the capacity to persuade audiences to embrace a more positive image. Policy - who you are, what you do and what you stand for - will always be the most important consideration.
Wednesday, 7 March 2012
Promised Land, Crusader State
I am still refining my understanding of Taiwan's public diplomacy and its location within approaches to soft power (western and non-western). Every time I speak to colleagues, present my ideas in seminars and cover the new literature I seem to take one step forwards and two steps back, thus challenging my own approaches again and again. While this is an exciting intellectual exercise, it can also be frustrating.
Following a discussion with Caitlin Schindler, a PhD student I am co-supervising with Robin Brown and who is tracing the history of American public diplomacy since Colonial times, I began to think that perhaps I need to interrogate a different literature for a while. So I decided to follow her trajectory and read about how the founders of modern America engaged in international communication and projected the new American identity abroad. This literature is based on the main thesis of my research, namely that Taiwan is communicating the wrong theme in its public diplomacy - culture (and traditional Chinese culture to boot) rather than the more exciting and appealing story of Taiwan's democratisation. However, I might benefit from understanding better how other "new" democracies have engaged in public diplomacy, and where better to start than post-Revolutionary America.
On Caitlin's advice I picked up a copy of Walter A. McDougall's Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776 (Mariner, 1997). This is proving a wonderful read and I am learning so much that I can apply to my own understanding of not only American and Taiwanese public diplomacy and soft power, but also Chinese approaches. For example, we learn that question we heard so often immediately after the 9/11 attacks - Why do they hate us? - is long-standing and has been directed equally, if not more, to friends rather than the US's foes: McDougall states that 'It's the contempt of our friends that really gets our goat' (p.9). And nothing caused more concern than the 1823 Monroe Doctrine which, said Otto von Bismarck, was 'a species of arrogance peculiarly American and inexcusable' (p.57). Sound familiar?
In Hamilton's "Original Major Draft" of George Washington's Farewell Address which established the notion of the Great Rule of American Unilateralism I detected parallels with Chinese public diplomacy. This may be a stretch, and perhaps I will come to regret making such statements; but there is talk in the Draft of cultivating harmony with all nations, the importance of sovereignty and not being entangled in foreign alliances. Moreover, commercial relations should always take precedence over political relations. All of these have been characteristics of Chinese foreign policy and themes in Chinese public diplomacy at one time or another.
In tackling this literature I may have taken a slight diversion from my East Asian interests, and I do not yet know how much this historical approach will inform my understanding of Taiwan's soft power and public diplomacy. However, it has re-awakened in me the sense that sometimes going off on an intellectual tangent can be very rewarding and is recommended from time to time.
Following a discussion with Caitlin Schindler, a PhD student I am co-supervising with Robin Brown and who is tracing the history of American public diplomacy since Colonial times, I began to think that perhaps I need to interrogate a different literature for a while. So I decided to follow her trajectory and read about how the founders of modern America engaged in international communication and projected the new American identity abroad. This literature is based on the main thesis of my research, namely that Taiwan is communicating the wrong theme in its public diplomacy - culture (and traditional Chinese culture to boot) rather than the more exciting and appealing story of Taiwan's democratisation. However, I might benefit from understanding better how other "new" democracies have engaged in public diplomacy, and where better to start than post-Revolutionary America.
On Caitlin's advice I picked up a copy of Walter A. McDougall's Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776 (Mariner, 1997). This is proving a wonderful read and I am learning so much that I can apply to my own understanding of not only American and Taiwanese public diplomacy and soft power, but also Chinese approaches. For example, we learn that question we heard so often immediately after the 9/11 attacks - Why do they hate us? - is long-standing and has been directed equally, if not more, to friends rather than the US's foes: McDougall states that 'It's the contempt of our friends that really gets our goat' (p.9). And nothing caused more concern than the 1823 Monroe Doctrine which, said Otto von Bismarck, was 'a species of arrogance peculiarly American and inexcusable' (p.57). Sound familiar?
In Hamilton's "Original Major Draft" of George Washington's Farewell Address which established the notion of the Great Rule of American Unilateralism I detected parallels with Chinese public diplomacy. This may be a stretch, and perhaps I will come to regret making such statements; but there is talk in the Draft of cultivating harmony with all nations, the importance of sovereignty and not being entangled in foreign alliances. Moreover, commercial relations should always take precedence over political relations. All of these have been characteristics of Chinese foreign policy and themes in Chinese public diplomacy at one time or another.
In tackling this literature I may have taken a slight diversion from my East Asian interests, and I do not yet know how much this historical approach will inform my understanding of Taiwan's soft power and public diplomacy. However, it has re-awakened in me the sense that sometimes going off on an intellectual tangent can be very rewarding and is recommended from time to time.
Wednesday, 29 February 2012
China's soft power and public diplomacy
Here is a recording of a talk I gave in Oxford two weeks ago. It was part of the Media & Governance Seminar Series for the Programme in Comparative Media, Law and Policy.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KlMCF-cldOM&list=PL70E56B646E48F1F3&index=6&feature=plpp_video
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KlMCF-cldOM&list=PL70E56B646E48F1F3&index=6&feature=plpp_video
Monday, 27 February 2012
The 'Facebook Revolutions,' 2011
At the weekend I participated in a fascinating workshop organised at Leeds University about the Arab Spring and Asia. Colleagues representing Middle East Studies, Politics, Development Studies, Asian Studies and Sociology met to discuss the recent political events in the Arab world (the 'Arab Spring') and their ripple effects across Asia. I was asked to introduce a discussion on New Social Movements, Media and Technology, and we had a lively debate. I thought it appropriate to share some of our thoughts here.
I expressed my unease with the idea that these were the Facebook or Social Media revolutions. Would the unrest have occurred anyway? After all, the European revolutions of 1848 had spread across the continent within two weeks; and the events of 1989 occurred with the help of satellite television and the fax machine. Besides, there is something determinist about claiming that these were social media uprisings, and I am very uncomfortable with that idea. Social media are simply another tool that can expedite events; they facilitate speed, mobilisation and the demonstration effect; but the uprisings were started, fed and endured by people struggling for the human condition.
Nevertheless there are three key things to note about the events of 2011.
First, a new generation of the digitally-literate is comfortable with these technologies, but also with the consequences of these technologies: networks, flat hierarchies, the convergence of platforms, and the ease with which anyone can now be the source, producer and consumer of news, information and opinion. We can see the same thing happening in Burma with the use of camera phones to capture videos of human rights abuses that are then downloaded to The Voice of Burma in Scandanavia before publication and circulation on the web.
Second, we cannot discount the role of television, and especially Al-Jazeera which is considered a credible and authoritative source of news in and about the Middle East. The difference now is that Al-Jazeera was one of the first TV stations to depend on 'citizen journalism' and social media to inform its programming.
Third, the reaction of the old political guard in the Middle East was interesting. They demonstrated that governments are beginning to realise 'if you can't beat them, join them'; and while in both Tunisia and Egypt the government did try to use old-fashioned techniques to control communication (technologies and the sources, and using censorship) they quickly recognised the possible value in trying to control the narrative itself. So the credibility of the political opposition that was tweeting and blogging and Facebooking was routinely discredited and their legitimacy questioned. It reminded me of the so-called 50 cent party in China - groups of young netizens who are paid for posting pro-govermement opinions on the web, thus trying to spin and manage the flow of information.
There was a consensus among the participants that the social media were a tool only in the 2011 uprisings, and that new media were in some senses a distraction from the reality of what was actually happening. There was a claim that by focusing on, and overestimating the importance of the social media we remove agency from the debates (especially when we lose sight of the fact that these were not 'Facebook' revolutions, but Tunisian Revolutions and Egyptian Revolutions). The uprisings (there was some discomfort with the term revolutions since only regimes and not whole social orders had been replaced) would have happened anyway. We need to look at the antecedents of these events and understan the long-term context. Struggles against oppression, corruption, and poverty have a long history in this part of the world - they did not just suddenly erupt in 2011. For this reason, the term Arab Spring is innaccurate (one participant said 'offensive') because it denies the historical specificities and processes, and suggests these uprisings appeared from nowhere. It also raises questions about news agendas and the way the Facebook Revolution and Arab Spring are simple and sexy tags for these otherwise complex events.
I expressed my unease with the idea that these were the Facebook or Social Media revolutions. Would the unrest have occurred anyway? After all, the European revolutions of 1848 had spread across the continent within two weeks; and the events of 1989 occurred with the help of satellite television and the fax machine. Besides, there is something determinist about claiming that these were social media uprisings, and I am very uncomfortable with that idea. Social media are simply another tool that can expedite events; they facilitate speed, mobilisation and the demonstration effect; but the uprisings were started, fed and endured by people struggling for the human condition.
Nevertheless there are three key things to note about the events of 2011.
First, a new generation of the digitally-literate is comfortable with these technologies, but also with the consequences of these technologies: networks, flat hierarchies, the convergence of platforms, and the ease with which anyone can now be the source, producer and consumer of news, information and opinion. We can see the same thing happening in Burma with the use of camera phones to capture videos of human rights abuses that are then downloaded to The Voice of Burma in Scandanavia before publication and circulation on the web.
Second, we cannot discount the role of television, and especially Al-Jazeera which is considered a credible and authoritative source of news in and about the Middle East. The difference now is that Al-Jazeera was one of the first TV stations to depend on 'citizen journalism' and social media to inform its programming.
Third, the reaction of the old political guard in the Middle East was interesting. They demonstrated that governments are beginning to realise 'if you can't beat them, join them'; and while in both Tunisia and Egypt the government did try to use old-fashioned techniques to control communication (technologies and the sources, and using censorship) they quickly recognised the possible value in trying to control the narrative itself. So the credibility of the political opposition that was tweeting and blogging and Facebooking was routinely discredited and their legitimacy questioned. It reminded me of the so-called 50 cent party in China - groups of young netizens who are paid for posting pro-govermement opinions on the web, thus trying to spin and manage the flow of information.
There was a consensus among the participants that the social media were a tool only in the 2011 uprisings, and that new media were in some senses a distraction from the reality of what was actually happening. There was a claim that by focusing on, and overestimating the importance of the social media we remove agency from the debates (especially when we lose sight of the fact that these were not 'Facebook' revolutions, but Tunisian Revolutions and Egyptian Revolutions). The uprisings (there was some discomfort with the term revolutions since only regimes and not whole social orders had been replaced) would have happened anyway. We need to look at the antecedents of these events and understan the long-term context. Struggles against oppression, corruption, and poverty have a long history in this part of the world - they did not just suddenly erupt in 2011. For this reason, the term Arab Spring is innaccurate (one participant said 'offensive') because it denies the historical specificities and processes, and suggests these uprisings appeared from nowhere. It also raises questions about news agendas and the way the Facebook Revolution and Arab Spring are simple and sexy tags for these otherwise complex events.
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