Taiwan Studies Workshop in Brno, 2013

I spent a week in Brno in the Czech Republic, attending a week-long workshop on Taiwan for students across Europe. The students were brilliant - enthusiastic, engaged, curious, insightful and delightful - and the level of discussion was admirable. They were all ready and eager to start at 9am on Monday morning and they were still there at 5pm on Friday. Such commitment!

I taught two sessions, one on Taiwan's democratic transition and one on Taiwan's soft power. The students delivered very thoughtful presentations on these topics and they had obviously worked very hard. While Ewa Aniskiewicz and Jacek Baniak from Krakow discussed what we might call the outputs-based approach - focusing on the methods Taiwan uses to exercise soft power in the international domain - Amina Abievai located soft power within a broader discussion of international relations theory, including a discussion of Niccolo Machiavelli and his commitment to hard power. While Amina also concentrated on Taiwan's outputs, including the famous Bubble Tea, HTC and the success of film director Ang Lee, her presentation ended on an interesting note: how might Taiwan counter the PRC's soft power? she asked. Her answer threw me: 'Make Taiwan the Hawaii of the Far East.' This is an unusual proposition and it took me some time to analyse and understand what Amina meant; but she makes a very perceptive point, and it is one I would like to consider further in my research.

Ewa Aniskiewicz & Jacek Baniek talking about Taiwan's soft power

Amina Abievai: Taiwan as "The Hawaii of the East"

Amina agreed that democracy is Taiwan's most valuable theme of public diplomacy and represents soft power in practice - as regular readers of this blog know only too well, this is one of my favourite subjects. Amina pushed me to think this through a little more. Making Taiwan the Hawaii of the Far East, although a rather simplistic approach (and I really do not know enough about Hawaii to conclude whether it is a good model or not, though Steve McGarrett and Magnum PI will have their own opinions), in essence means making Taiwan a desirable place to live. I had just finished suggesting to the students that governments should not really be involved in the soft power process; they certainly should not try to strategise its exercise, but rather soft power is a natural by-product of what a government does and how it behaves at home and abroad. In short, I said, the job of governments is to govern, and to do so in an ethical, transparent and accountable way. Governments should let others tell the 'soft power' story if there is one and allow audiences the space to reach their own judgements based on what they see governments actually doing.

As Amina suggested, this means that the government of Taiwan should not try too hard to exercise its soft power. In addition to being a democratic power, the government can govern in such a way that the island continues to develop its potential - in education, healthcare, the environment, housing, the infrastructure and other policy areas - and this effort expended in actually governing Taiwan will reap soft power benefits.

As a postscript I would like to add that last week I read a chapter by a colleague who suggested that the exercise of soft power is all about talking up the good points about one's own country. I disagree and explained to the students that honesty is far more effective. A government accumulates far more credibility if it is open and honest about its mistakes and enters into discussion and dialogue about the less attractive characteristics of the country it represents. Audiences appreciate candour, self-reflection and self-criticism and the capacity to accept criticism from others. This may not lead to trust, but will not doubt contribute to a sense of self-integrity which, in soft power terms, is a good starting point.  

Silence is not always golden: The communication of Taiwan's democracy

As the keynote speaker at the 2013 annual conference of the European Association of Taiwan Studies (EATS), Professor T.J. Cheng of  William and Mary College delivered a characteristically interesting paper on Offshore Democracies: An Ideational Challenge to China. His intention is to understand how Taiwan is perceived in mainland China through examining the official and non-official discourses there about the island's democratic institutions and procedures. Two sections of his talk provoked a response from a soft power and public diplomacy perspective.

First, T.J. outlined the sibau minzhu, the 'quartet of evils' that define the official view about Taiwan's democracy. Discourses about the 'evils' are framed by key-words that focus on the more disturbing side of Taiwan's political evolution - black-gold, party-splitting etc.

From a PD perspective, such official discourses constitute part of the environment in which Taiwan must operate. It is unfortunate that China chooses to view Taiwan in such an out-dated way - the problems of corruption are now far worse in the mainland than they are in Taiwan where there is much less electoral corruption than previously - but the question that Taiwan must confront is how to respond and work within the constraints? Taiwan is not in a position to change the Chinese conversation, so must pay far more attention to its soft power capital and the quality of its public diplomacy strategy than previously. The external environment frames the architectures, methods, success and failures of Taiwan's international communications and determines their impact on elite audiences and mass opinion. I have talked about this many times in published papers and in blogs, and this argument forms the core of the book I am now writing which examines the interaction of structure and agency to understand Taiwan's soft power.

I felt that T.J. had inadvertently stumbled on a set of contradictions when he claimed that 'Taiwan's democracy is like a silent movie, more palatable than soundbites', and he applauded Taiwan's government for not hectoring the PRC about human rights abuses. T.J. is right to isolate the practice of democracy as a particularly useful communications strategy - in Public Diplomacy, actions really do speak louder than words - and by providing a model Chinese democracy, Taiwan is demonstrating the fallacy of so-called Asian values: There really is a political alternative for China. However, silence is not an option for Taiwan, and measured, strategic soundbites do have their value. Why be silent when the world is not listening to you anyway? For a state facing Taiwan's predicament, silence means an absence of attention, and so the government does not/cannot challenge the dominant narratives conducted in Beijing. Silence will not undermine a depiction of Taiwan which centres on 'the quartet of evils', circulating within a tightly controlled media and education system.  

T.J. is correct to commend the absence of hectoring and pontificating in Taiwan's interactions with the PRC, but such methods of communication are neither strategic nor desirable as they can backfire on the source of the message. Rather, Taiwan must strike a balance between silence - letting the story of Taiwan's democracy speak for itself - and making sure that story is heard by audiences conditioned to have a very different perception of reality. 

Another speaker on the Senkaku/Diayutai dispute prefaced her paper with a reference to 'manipulation' by the international media on this subject, evidence for which is provided by the fact that the media concentrate overwhelmingly on Japan and China and ignore Taiwan's claims on the islands. This sounds very similar to claims by Beijing that the international (read western) media deliberately demonise China, and that this accounts for the continuing popularity of the theory of cultural imperialism in China. As a communications scholar, I would reply that the international media know and understand China and Japan; their frames are familiar. Taiwan, however, is largely unfamiliar to international media consumers who have no real understanding of Taiwan or why Taiwan matters. The media will choose to sideline Taiwan because of the competition of voices, interests, stories and news-space, but also because journalists are denied the kind of structured and continuous interaction with diplomats and press officers that may yield coverage. My research reveals that Taiwan is passive in its acceptance of this situation - that its public diplomats and press officers sit back, see a crowded market place and believe that change is impossible. Being voiceless therefore becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.  

These comments connect with my discussion of T.J.'s paper and the consequences of accepting a 'silent movie' approach. Again, the international media are not necessarily ignoring Taiwan; Taiwan is not getting the message out and its voice heard because of the inadequacies of the public diplomacy structure.     

Preaching to the converted, or a small step in the right direction?

The following report was published in the Taipei Times on 12 July: '"Study camp" introduces nation to allied countries' (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/07/12/2003537552).

Twenty-eight representatives from Taiwan's diplomatic allies in the Pacific - Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu (what do you mean you have never heard of them?) - are visiting the island as part of its 'cultural diplomacy' strategy. The visitors will attend seminars on a range of subjects including relations with China, the economy and, most importantly, democracy. Among the particpants are politicians, the media and representatives from  business.

It would be easy to be both cynical and sceptical about the Study Camp programme which started in 2010: the Taipei Times is stretching the definition of Cultural Diplomacy; and isn't this preaching to the converted? Surely Taiwan does not need to convince its allies that Taiwan is a vibrant, democratic society? Shouldn't more effort be devoted to such activities in those countries which do not recognise the international status of Taiwan?

However, every journey begins with one step, and this is a small step in the right direction. First, it is extremely important that Taiwan maintain the few diplomatic allies it has left (and not through the old methods of cheque-book diplomacy that occurred in Central America and which my PhD student, Colin Alexander, writes about). The cup is either half empty or half full: Taiwan has only 23 formal allies? Or Taiwan has 23 formal allies, despite decades of pressure from the PRC to switch allegiance. As students of Taiwan we too often focus on the former, more depressing picture, and lose sight of the more positive perspective. After all, the symbolic significance of losing even the smallest ally would be devastating for Taiwan; when you have only 23 formal diplomatic allies, one is a lot to lose (and there is the possibility of a domino effect to factor in to this scenario).

Second, the Study Camp is targeting the right demographics -  the movers and shakers who may also be opinion leaders. Public diplomacy often works best through local authoritative figures, and provided the politicians and media are trusted in these societies (and I am ashamed to say I know little about the political situation in Tuvalu or Nauru) then they are in a strong position to mediate information and opinion on behalf of Taiwan.

Third, these opinion leaders are visiting Taiwan to expand their knowledge of that society; this is not remote work being undertaken in their home countries, but is rather an attempt to showcase Taiwan first hand. There is no substitute for such endeavours. If you want people to know Taiwan and to love Taiwan, they must be given the opportunity to see, touch, smell and taste Taiwan ('Taiwan will touch your heart,' said the old logo - which is far better than the current pedestrian and meaningless 'Taiwan, the heart of Asia').

Finally, learning about democracy is on the agenda. The report does not say anything about how this is communicated to the vistors (further research by yours truly is required), but at least the diplomats are paying attention to its value as a strategic narrative. All in all, a small step in the right direction.            

"Capitalizing on Taiwan's cultural Soft Power"

An article has been published in Taiwan Today (http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?ctNode=1767&xItem=177647&mp=9) suggesting yet again that the cultural industries are at the heart of Taiwan's soft power. Following my interviews during the summer with government agencies involved in Taiwan's internationl outreach, I came to the conclusion that (a) Taiwan is placing too much faith in culture; (b) the government agencies responsible really do not know what they are doing or why they are doing it. I am heartened that, according to the article, the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA) recognises that "Taiwan's advantage is its freedom and democracy," but the Council, like the Government Informational Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, chooses to ignore the narrative of Taiwan's democratisation in international outreach programmes, preferring instead to claim that Taiwan is the preserver of traditional Chinese culture. As I have said time and again - in these blogs and to the government agencies themselves - this is the wrong strategy.

What is clear from the article published in Taiwan Today is that there is a complete ignorance of what soft power really is and how it might be exercised. Government officials I spoke to were unable to answer three key questions: (1) For what purpose is Taiwan engaging in soft power? (ii) To which audiences? (iii) How doe you know if it is having any impact? The final question is the main problem with over-dependence on culture as a soft power strategy as I have made clear in previous postings. This is summarised in the quotation from the GIO: "Taiwan's pop music is a culturally and commercially valuable type of soft power ..." Why and to what benefit in soft power terms?

I identify three further problems in the article. The first is the suggestion that Taiwan should copy South Korea's strategy and therefore success. Certainly Taiwan could look abroad to its neighbours for inspiration, but it already stands accused of copying the PRC (remember the five mascots for the Taipei Floral Expo which were clear copies of the five mascots for the Beijing Olympics?). South Korea is not a model because it is a different country operating within a different set of social, political and cultural contexts. Taiwan needs to have the confidence to "stand up" (ironic words to use on the 100th Anniversary of the ROC) and be itself.

The second problem is in the concluding sentence of the article which is a quotation from a CCA official: "If we let up, other nations will catch up, and we'll lose our chance." Soft power is not constrained by time pressures; it works best as part of a long-term strategy, and its practitioners must realise that it can take years to build trust, credibility and appeal. Any attempt to design a short-term strategy that will have immediate effect is doomed to failure. Moreover, it is not a competition. By fearing that other nations will 'catch up', this quotation reveals the lack of confidence in Taiwan's soft power as a method of natural attraction.

Finally, I am genuinely peturbed that the photo used to accompany the article depicts the GIO Minister showing the government's support for an epic film released this year, "Seediq Bale". Since Seediq Bale, when it was released in Taiwan, did not have English subtitles, it is difficult to understand what soft power the government expects it to have. I know many expatriates living in Taiwan who wanted to see this landmark contribution to Taiwan's creative industries - a stirring story of Taiwan's  history - but could not watch it due to the absence of subtitles. A soft power opportunity missed?   
 

Despatches from Taiwan 4: The Taiwan Academies

My final blog from Taiwan in 2011. Today, my article about the Taiwan Academies appeared in the Taipei Times newspaper (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2011/09/14/2003513215).

As a close observer of Taiwan’s public diplomacy for almost twenty years, I recognise the government’s intentions in this area and respect them. Taiwan is in a very difficult international situation and must struggle to be heard by a world that on the whole chooses to avoid listening to it. In such an environment, public diplomacy must remain an instrument of Taiwan’s foreign policy. In the absence of hard power – diplomatic recognition, international legitimacy and membership of the most important international organisations – and with a contested sovereignty that involves a bigger and more powerful neighbour, Taiwan will only survive and prosper by devoting more attention and resources to the study and application of ‘soft power.’  

                However, my research has revealed a fundamental flaw within Taiwan’s current public diplomacy strategy, and this is the over-dependence on culture (and traditional Chinese culture) as the dominant theme in international communications and engagement. Following this is the proposal that Taiwan should create the Taiwan Academies to help project this culture, teach traditional Chinese characters and history, and hence generate interest in the island. This, however, is a false logic. I suggest that the Taiwan Academies will not add any value or benefit to current endeavours, and will certainly not alleviate the many serious problems facing Taiwan in the international arena.

The first reason is this proposal demonstrates how Taiwan is trying to run before it can walk. Despite all the excellent work of the Government Information Office (which needs reorganising, not abolishing), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Council of Cultural Affairs, and the Taiwan Tourism Bureau, I am sad to say that few members of the public across the world either know or care about Taiwan. Many would have great difficulty locating Taiwan on a map. Why does the government think that the Taiwan Academies will make any difference? If no-one knows where Taiwan is, why would they seek out and engage with the Academies? Before Taiwan begins to think about creating anything resembling the Academies, it is essential to first make sure the world is aware of Taiwan and starts to know its story.

                The second reason the Taiwan Academies are a bad idea is the most important: They will be in direct competition with the PRC’s Confucius Institutes. The government and the civil service may assure me that this is not the case, and I concede that this it is not Taiwan’s intention to engage in such competition. However, in the realm of public diplomacy, sometimes the intention is less significant than the message, and it is certainly less important than the perception of actions among global audiences.  For the international community the Taiwan Academies are a direct competitor with the Confucius Institutes, and whatever the government says to the contrary will not make the slightest difference. This perception will make competition the story, and Taiwan’s good intentions will be ignored. Once again, Taiwan will be seen as lacking innovation and will be accused of simply riding the coat-tails of the PRC. (Why did the Taipei Floral Expo use almost exactly the same five mascots as the 2008 Beijing Olympics? Did no-one spot the similarity and consider how this would project a negative image of Taiwan?)

                The Taiwan Academies are a symptom of a larger and more serious problem in Taiwan’s public diplomacy that has revealed itself during my 2011 research. Taiwan is currently telling the wrong story to the world. By emphasising culture as the priority in the public diplomacy strategy – Taiwan as the preserver of traditional Chinese culture – Taiwan is missing the opportunity to define itself and tell a more exciting and relevant story that would generate international interest. Taiwan is the first Chinese democracy. It has experienced one of the smoothest and most successful political transitions in Asia and is today a vibrant challenge to the crazy idea that democracy is somehow inimical to Asian or Chinese culture (the nonsense of the so-called ‘Asian Values’ theory). Remember that whatever happens or does not happen in the PRC – whether China marches forward to democracy or retrenches under internal pressures and fervent nationalism – Taiwan will always be the first Chinese democracy. How this happened is a fascinating and often moving story, but where is it being told? Who is telling it? It may come as a surprise to learn that few people across the world are interested in the history and calligraphy of traditional Chinese characters (and how many visitors to the exhibitions being organised around the world know the difference between traditional and simplified characters?). Culture must be part of a more holistic strategy; it has an important and strategic role to play and certainly helps to define Taiwan. However, it is not the whole story and should not be the entire focus of Taiwan’s public diplomacy strategy. In the struggle to define Taiwan, in the noble efforts to identify what is unique and different about this island, the current strategy is deliberately ignoring the one narrative that makes Taiwan stand out and differentiate it from the PRC. To repeat, Taiwan is the First Chinese Democracy.

                Moreover, Taiwan is not ‘the heart of Asia’ despite claims in the new advertising campaign. Every country in Asia claims it is the true heart of the continent (think ‘Malaysia, truly Asia’). ‘Touch your Heart’ was a far more successful brand. It suggests warmth, friendship, intimacy, the promise of a genuinely touching experience. ‘The heart of Asia’ tells us nothing, promises nothing. Taiwan no longer stands out from the crowd. Moreover, by changing the brand, Taiwan has destroyed the brand-familiarity among the audience, the result no doubt of many years and a considerable amount of finance.

                Taiwan has many opportunities to improve its public diplomacy, to persuade the world that this is a vibrant, modern, democratic society. Taiwan has an envious amount of “soft power” capital at its disposal because of its recent history (not because of ancient Chinese history – the PRC has that market cornered and Taiwan cannot compete). This involves telling a political and social, rather than a cultural story. By creating the Academies, Taiwan is suggesting that it knows nothing about itself – what makes this island a unique and fascinating place. Moreover, it reveals that Taiwan neither knows nor cares about its target audience (a fatal error), preferring instead to believe that your audience will accept whatever you give them. Above all, Taiwan is creating a narrative which suggests Taiwan is (at best) competing with and (at worst) copying the PRC and its Confucian Institutes. It is not too late to face the facts: the Taiwan Academies are a bad idea, and it would be in Taiwan’s long term interest to abandon their creation immediately.

Despatches from Taiwan (2)

A few days ago I was asked by a reporter based in Taiwan to comment on a new law which requires any caught sharks entering port to have their fins attached. Taiwan is the first country in Asia to enact such a law. The reporter asked me about the public diplomacy and soft power impact of this. Here is my reply:

This is a very interesting subject and several months ago, Taiwan was featured in a TV programme in the UK about shark fishing,so it has featured on the media agenda. Normally attention on this topic focuses on China and Japan; the fact that Taiwan was featured (named as shamed, as we say in the UK) is quite significant.

It is quite possible that the Ma Ying-jeou administration was thinking about soft power in pasing this law. The question is: will it make a difference? The problem is not only the severing of fins outside the port, but the idea of eating an endangered species at all. I am sure this law will have positive consequences, but it will have to be seen and sold as only the first step.

Hence any consequences that this law will have in soft power terms depends on the public diplomacy process that is implemented to publicise it. In other words, there is no point passing a law for international opinion if international opinion never hears about it. It is essential that Taiwan's diplomats, government spokesmen and NGOs in Taiwan and around the world make sure that this law is known and reported by the most important media. It is ok to have the message, and this is the most important thing (policy must always precede presentation); now it is extremely important to concentrate on selling the message. It may help Taiwan's image - each journey must begin with one small step - but it may also raise expectations of further legislation. As I said at the beginning, will the next step be the banning of shark fishing altogether? This would have a very dramatic soft power impact.

Despatches from Taiwan (I)

I have been in Taiwan for less than 48 hours and already several notable stories related to public diplomacy have caught my attention.

I will gloss over the local mania for Lady Gaga as she plays sell-out concerts in Taiwan. Singing two more songs here than she did in Singapore obviously means she loves Taiwan; while TV news stations spend precious time (20 minutes in one case) detailing every detail of her life, career and stay on the island so far. Is this an example of American soft power in action?

I will likewise mention only in passing the new-found affection for Tom Hanks after he told a press conference for his new film that Los Angeles should be more like Taipei. Apparently, Mr Hanks believes that Taiwanese all ride scooters with the wind blowing in their hair. That Mr Hanks has never been to Taipei is obvious; the only thing blowing in your hair in Taipei is the pollution from all the other scooters around you. Yet naturally the media here seized on Mr Hanks’s words, as any global attention is important for a small unrecognised island competing to be heard.

Morever, I am sure that the publication of a photograph showing three students at the Ministry of Defence’s Armor Training Command and Armor School wearing Nazi Waffen-SS uniforms will not damage Taiwan’s relations with Israel. The Ministry apologised to Israel’s Representative to Taiwan who conceded that ‘it was a mistake of ignorance and not intention.’ The Representative promised to work with the relevant educational institutions in Taiwan to develop educational programmes on the Holocaust. This was an embarrassing episode for Taiwan, but not as serious as it might have been.   

Two more important stories have potential public diplomacy interest. The first is a rather frivolous story about the local reaction to a US food blogger in Texas who recalled on CNN’s iReport his bad experience with a Taiwanese delicacy, century eggs or pi dian. Legislators in Taiwan called Americans ‘chicken-hearted’ and said Westerners ‘should be more courageous and willing to try new things’. Overlooking the fact that this is exactly what the blogger had done – and found he did not like what he had eaten – the Government Information Office Minister Philip Yang said the article had ‘damaged’ the nation’s image. However, it is possible to argue that in criticising the blogger’s right to have an opinion about the food he has eaten, his detractors have damaged Taiwan’s image themselves. In writing about Chinese soft power I often discuss China’s inability to accept foreign criticism and suggest that this is a serious hindrance to that country’s soft power capacity: a serious global player must expect and accept criticism from time to time. By over-reacting in this way to a misinterpreted blog, the Taiwanese are falling into the same trap as their neighbours on the other side of the Strait. My friend Paul Rockower whom I first met in Taipei last year blogs often about Taiwan’s ‘gastrodiplomacy’ (there is a link to him from this site). I look forward to reading what he makes of this episode.

The second story that caught my attention concerns the failure of Taiwan’s institutions of higher education to recruit students from the PRC. The Ministry of Education had approved the recruitment of 2,141 Chinese students, equal to about 1 percent of Taiwanese students in the university system per year. In fact, only 1,263 were accepted and a mere 975 will actually enrol. One reason for this is the ‘three limits, six noes’ policy that the opposition DPP insisted should regulate the flow of students. The ‘three limits’ refer to caps on the numbers of students, the number of Chinese universities recognised as eligible for the scheme, and limits on the types of Chinese diplomas that can be accredited.

More damaging are the ‘six noes’, banning Chinese students from receiving scholarships or professional licenses, from remaining or working Taiwan after their graduation, from receiving extra points on exams, and from taking civil service examinations. In addition, most of the universities in Taiwan able to recruit from China are outside Taipei, and include institutions on the islands of Quemoy and Penghu. Why would a student from China wish to live and study in Quemoy, a beautiful but sleepy island and which was at the epicentre of hostilities between Taiwan and China in the 1950s?

In other words, apart from receiving a degree from a university that may be far away from Taiwan’s vibrant capital city – or perhaps on another island altogether – there is little incentive for Chinese students to study here. If soft power is about persuasion through attraction, shouldn’t Taiwan be doing more to encourage students from across the Strait to study, and perhaps live, work and contribute to Taiwan’s economy after graduation? In the past, students from beyond the Iron Curtain defected; now they acquire visas.        

Given the importance and success of the student experience in facilitating public diplomacy – a PhD student at ICS, Molly Sisson, is researching this very area (again there is a link to her blog here) – it seems incredible that Taiwan would impose such restrictions. This is Taiwan’s opportunity to showcase itself to China’s potential future political, social, intellectual and economic elites. Beijing has taken an enormous risk in allowing its students to travel abroad in such huge numbers, and an even greater risk in allowing them to travel to Taiwan – democratic and ‘Free China’ - for their education.

It is possible that most Chinese students wish to attend universities in the UK, US or Australian universities; perhaps the higher tuition fees and cost of living in Taiwan compared with China is a prohibition on the island’s attraction as a destination for students from the PRC. Nevertheless, it does seem that by imposing such a strict policy as the ‘three limits, six noes,’ Taiwan’s potential public diplomacy with Chinese across the Strait is taking an unnecessary beating.    

Say Taiwan!!

Here is an interesting way that Taiwan is promoting itself

http://taiwanroc100.tw/100homestay_en/default.aspx

Hosted by the Council for Cultural Affairs, this initiative invites 'foreign guests' to apply for the chance to win an all-expenses paid trip to Taiwan to celeberate the one hundredth anniversary of the Republic of China. In return, guests are required to blog, tweet and post on Facebook their impressions of life in Taiwan. The webpage states the following:

To celebrate the centennial founding of Republic of China (Taiwan), the Council for Culture Affairs Republic of China (Taiwan) will be holding the “Republic of China (Taiwan) International Youth Week - Centennial Homestay” event- by inviting 250 international guests to Taiwan to experience the authentic lifestyle of the warm-hearted Taiwanese people.

 The event aims for the international guests to find out a lot more about Taiwan and its influence on the world and at the same time, to experience the good nature of the Taiwanese culture. This event encourages international guests to travel all around Taiwan, noting down their travel experiences and share them on social media (i.e. Facebook and Twitter) so people around the world can find out more about the culture and the friendliness of the Taiwanese people.

The international guests and the world will be able to witness Taiwan’s various achievements after 100 years of development, sharing the joy of the centennial founding of Taiwan. This will open the door for the rest of the world to have more interaction with the Taiwanese people.

This seems like an excellent pd initiative and represents Taiwan's strengths. It is a valuable example of citizen diplomacy and P2P relationship building which can often be the most effective method of international communication. It does, however, raise a couple of issues in my mind:

First, how is this being advertised beyond a small community of people around the world already interested in Taiwan? There is scope here for broader engagement, but there does not seem to be any way around the dilemma that few people know or care about Taiwan. I only know about this initiative because of my research interests and my involvement in a China-related email discussion group. How to sell this beyond a core constituency?

Second, like other examples of citizen or P2P diplomacy this is a brave initiative for it removes control of the message from the government/state/pd agencies and locates it with the 'people'. Are they on message? How can the Taiwan government/should the Taiwan government try to maintain a positive image if the message is designed and disseminated by non-Taiwanese visitors?

If done correctly, I think this is a method of pd that Taiwan should develop and expand. It overcomes issues of resources, and while the PRC takes a very broad-brush approach to pd (via broadcasting and wasting money on CCTV 9 and Xinhua TV) this initiative demonstrates (i) Taiwan's embrace of social media (presenting a youthful, dynamic and energised self-identity that will resonate with the youthful target audience); and (ii) that Taiwan understands the need to build relationships between people, not just between governments and people. I look forward to exploring these issues further when I am conducting my fieldwork in Taipei this summer.    

Taiwan's soft power and public diplomacy - some preliminary thoughts

Last week I attended the International Studies Conference in Montreal. I wish to post here the paper I presented at the conference; it represents some initial thoughts about my current research on Taiwan and China, and I welcome feedback.

Comparing the Soft Power and Public Diplomacy of China and Taiwan

Gary D. Rawnsley

University of Leeds, UK

Prepared for the annual conference of the International Studies Association

Montreal March 2011

‘There’s something to be said about being small’

                (Advertisement for tourism in Taiwan, The Economist, 12-18 June 2010)

The Republic of Taiwan (hereafter Taiwan) has diplomatic relations with just 23 minor powers, and has 92 representative offices in the capitals and major cities of 57 other countries. Taiwan does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with any major powers and is excluded from representation in the United Nations. Although Taiwan has, since 1987, experienced one of the smoothest, peaceful and most successful transitions to democracy in Asia, it remains ostracised by the international community which refuses to recognise its legitimacy.

This paper is a preliminary discussion of ideas generated in preparing a major research project which compares and explains the soft power and public diplomacy strategies of Taiwan and China.[1] The research will attempt to triangulate the approaches developed in international relations, diplomacy studies and international communications to examine and understand how states without diplomatic recognition design and use communications strategies to compensate. Specifically, the project uses Taiwan as the principal case-study of a democratic minor power that soft power theory asserts should be able to communicate effectively with foreign publics, but in reality is meeting little success in doing so because it operates ‘within a distinctive kind of environment’ (Lukes, 2005: 485).

                Taiwan is locked within a particular set of political environments that include: relations with Beijing (which maintains that Taiwan is a province of China and has successfully ostracised Taiwan in the international arena) and the US; the absence of formal diplomatic relations with major powers; a contested national identity (which makes the Taiwan ‘brand’ difficult to identify and sell); and democratic electoral competition (which means that in Taiwan, foreign and China policy must be made within the context of public opinion and the awareness of the potential consequences for electoral support). I suggest that the specific context in which Taiwan must survive renders obsolete any attempt to categorise it as a particular-sized power; it is Taiwan’s international position and its relationship (or absence of) with other powers that defines its status.

                All governments are confronted with the challenges imposed by their own particular political environments; and these environments have convinced governments that they have to design soft power strategies to survive and prosper. In effect, soft power is considered – erroneously – as a substitute for hard power, and there is a prevailing confidence in the ability of soft power to raise a nation’s profile, prestige and influence.

                The question then becomes: Can governments be the architects of their own soft power? Can soft power be strategised? If we acknowledge that soft power is about the attraction of core values, it follows that it is a natural by-product of cultural and political appeal. It is an attraction based on the ideals and principals a government or country values and upholds. The attraction derives from the appeal of the perceived consistency between the message and the how the government behaves. In this scenario, any attempt to strategise and create doctrines for soft power misses the basic point, that it is an ‘intangible attraction’ and therefore beyond the policy-making capacity of cabinets and kings.[2]

                The challenge in the next stage is to translate the intangible attributes of soft power into tangible outcomes: how does soft power connect with national foreign policy objectives? How does it contribute to their realisation, and how does a government know when its soft power is working? As Nye (2008: x) has noted: ‘Whether the possession of power resources actually produces favourable outcomes depends on the context and skill of the agent in converting the resources into behavioural outcomes.’ This is where strategic communications, including public diplomacy, begins to assert their presence, for unless there is a visible and recognisable product, it is difficult if not impossible to decide whether or not the resources devoted to communications have been worth the effort. Hence the deed often becomes the most significant and potentially most influential message in public diplomacy (‘actions speak louder than words’):

It is sometimes possible for a country to do very well by being good. To support ‘good works’, to perform ‘good’ deeds, to use ‘good’ words, and to project ‘good’ images can pay off in terms of international prestige, and in even more practical expressions others’ appreciation (Henrikson, 2005: 1).

The principal challenge is that governments and other actors within nation-states may be able to control the design, the message and the transmission of public diplomacy, but they can exercise no comparable control over reception. Hence the design and dissemination are only part of the story. As Mattern (2005) has noted, ‘Attraction is a rather subjective experience, which raises the question of what makes something or someone alluring to some and not to others.’ This is because the message is open to interpretation, but also because audiences may be subject to other internal and external influences – what in communications we call cognitive dissonance – that can affect reception.

All agents involved in international communications must confront this problem, but Taiwan and China must encounter these challenges within specific political frameworks. To understand this, I turn to Nancy Snow’s (2009: 4) list of features that give a country soft power advantage, namely:

1. When culture and ideas match prevailing global norms
2. When a nation has greater access to multiple communication channels that can influence how issues are framed in global news, and
3. When a country’s credibility is enhanced by domestic and international behaviour.    

This list sets out very clearly the paradox at the heart of this research, for according to these criteria the People’s Republic of China (PRC) should not be as successful as Taiwan in soft power and public diplomacy terms.

                It is possible to argue that the PRC is at a ‘decisive disadvantage’ in all three areas: Beijing has difficulty persuading the liberal-democratic world that China’s agenda is compatible, if not consistent, with the perceived norms and values of democracies; China is only just developing the capacity to frame stories in the global news media, but this remains limited (more information does not necessarily mean better communication, and it is difficult to appreciate how Xinhua’s new global television service will accelerate China’s public diplomacy; the same number of people who don’t watch CCTV International will not watch Xinhua);  and China’s domestic and international behaviour has not inspired confidence, though we do have to recognise very clear improvements in Chinese foreign policy and its interaction with international regimes. However, it only takes one episode to undo all this good work which undermines almost in an instant any credibility and soft power capital that the PRC has accumulated in other areas.

                In contrast, Taiwan has emerged from forty years of one-party authoritarian rule and is now a strong, maturing liberal democracy which experienced one of the smoothest, most peaceful regime changes in Asia. The people of Taiwan conduct regular free and fair elections, and they have delivered two transfers of political power (thus satisfying Samuel Huntington’s ‘two turnover test’). Moreover, former President Chen Shui-bian was investigated, arrested and jailed on charges of corruption, sending a very clear signal that in modern Taiwan, no-one is above the law. Not only is Taiwan’s domestic and international behaviour a match for the PRC, but by being a democracy its culture and ideas match prevailing norms in at least a large part of the world. It is not surprising that successive regimes have recognised the soft power capital in being a democracy: President Chen and his Vice-President, Lu Hsiu-lien, emphasised Taiwan’s democratic credentials as a major source of the regime’s soft power; and President Ma Yin-jeou has likewise acknowledged the potential power of personifying democratic ideals and values. Meanwhile, Taiwan has long been recognised as a leading economic power – part of the Taiwan ‘brand’ – long before China began its own comprehensive process of economic reform[3].  Yet neither Taiwan’s international strength nor its image positively reflects its credentials. As Gerald Chan (1997: 37) has noted, Taiwan is ‘financially rich, but diplomatically poor.’ Józef Batora (2006: 55) has argued that, ‘for small and medium –sized states, public diplomacy represents an opportunity to gain influence and shape the international agenda in ways that go beyond their limited hard power resources.’

Taiwan has certainly engineered many improvements in its global outreach strategies since I published my first book on the subject in 1999. For example, successive governments in Taipei have moved discourses beyond the Cold War frameworks that defined Taiwan as ‘Free China’ until the end of the 1990s. Ma Ying-jeou’s administration, elected in 2008, has demonstrated a more nuanced understanding of how soft power and public diplomacy work and how they can connect to the reality of Taiwan’s international situation by not framing issues solely within the context of cross-Strait relations.

                Ma has labelled his approach ‘flexible diplomacy’ (during the remaining years of the Lee Teng-hui administration that ended in 2000, we were used to hearing about ‘pragmatic diplomacy’), as outlined in a Presidential statement in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2008. Ma said that the ‘most important asset’ of Taiwan’s foreign policy ‘is our democracy, our way of life, our willingness to maintain cross-strait stability, and our determination to fulfil our obligations to the international community …’ He advised that Taiwan should no longer compete directly and obsessively with the PRC, but should instead strive to create a win-win relationship with Beijing. In dealing with those governments that do not recognise Taiwan, Ma said ‘we must jettison our past image of a troublemaker, refurbish our international credibility, and re-establish mutual trust with those countries.’

I present three hypotheses that are driving this research project. As yet, these are untested and I am not in a position to confirm or deny their validity. I present them here as a précis of my current interests and to solicit feedback.

1. International recognition is a precondition for successful public diplomacy and soft power; it is an ‘appropriate resource’ (Lukes, 2005: 479) which can help a state meet its foreign policy objectives.
2. Hard power, international recognition and therefore legitimacy trump the soft power capital of democratic values.
3. Soft power is therefore only meaningful as a practical arrangement of statesmanship for governments who possess power in other areas.           

So, using Taiwan as a case-study the primary objective of this research is to understand and explain how the absence of international diplomatic recognition affects the soft power and public diplomacy of “illegitimate” powers. This then requires a detailed comparison of the communications strategies designed and executed by the PRC and Taiwan to understand why, within the greater political and strategic frameworks in which they operate, one is more successful at national and international projection than the other. The research represents an attempt to unravel the paradox of democratic Taiwan’s limited success in soft power terms and the (neo-)authoritarian PRC’s apparent success.

                By success I am referring to the acquisition of international attention. Because we are dealing with intangibles, it is very difficult to correlate changes in attitudes or behaviour with soft power. When we look more closely at China’s soft power and public diplomacy, we must question whether the PRC can move beyond attention-seeking and realise tangible foreign policy goals.

                In the US after 911 it was common to hear Americans, including President George W. Bush, ask: ‘Why do they hate us?’ In public diplomacy terms, this immediately begs a second question in response: ‘Why don’t you ask them?’

                The Chinese often ask a similar question, especially of the western media: Why do they criticise us so much? Zhao Qizheng, Director of the Foreign Affairs Committee and former director of the State Council Information Office, has often talked about the need for China to develop a soft power strategy in response to the alleged demonization by the western media and the constant chatter in some quarters about the so-called China threat. ‘This situation,’ said Zhao, ‘requires China to pro-actively establish a public diplomacy policy to improve the international image of China.’ While the idea of demonization is extremely problematic – in accepting the existence of a political conspiracy among the western media one is conveniently ignoring the differences in professional news values between Chinese and non-Chinese media and audiences – this statement is intriguing because it reveals high-level acknowledgement of the need for public diplomacy and a motive for doing so, however specious and reactive that motive may be.

                The problem with most public diplomacy is that it is built from the top-down: ‘We speak, you listen.’ Few public diplomacy strategies, including the UK government’s National Security Strategy (2008) include listening as a key activity in their outreach. In the age of participatory and unmediated methods of communication – twitter, blogs, social networking sites, citizen journalism – there is no excuse for assuming that governments should speak and publics should listen. Publics want to talk too – to each other and to governments. This is valuable for public diplomacy because audiences tend to trust each other more than governments (the ‘last three feet’ in propaganda and public diplomacy – ie. personal interaction – are the most important), and because it provides for those responsible for public diplomacy a level of intelligence about public opinion their predecessors (trained perhaps in the era of the Cold War ‘hypodermic needle model’ or ‘magic bullet theory’ of communications) could not imagine: what does the world really think of you, the policies you are following and the image you are presenting? Listening to audiences also helps to tailor the message and its method of delivery according to specific social and cultural constraints.

                However, first it is important to get the image right. If the question is ‘Why do they hate us?’ perhaps another satisfactory response might be: ‘Do they really know us?’ which is immediately followed by another crucial question: ‘Do we know ourselves?’ Public diplomacy must begin by understanding who ‘we’ are before we attempt to understand the audience with whom we wish to communicate.

                We cannot deny that the Chinese think they know who they are: the PRC has a strong self-identity (even though it is often contradictory, hence William Callahan’s description of China as the Pessoptimist Nation (2009)); and this identity is increasingly based on power and self-confidence – the idea of Zhongguo and (inter)national recovery, rapid and widespread economic development, and increasingly (and perhaps disturbingly) a form of radical nationalism. While China’s enthusiastic embrace of soft power and public diplomacy is welcome as an alternative to the dependence on hard power, does China listen enough to a wide range of actors and institutions to understand why the international community is sometimes so critical of its actions and behaviour?

                Nye has used the term ‘meta-soft power’ to describe ‘the state’s willingness to criticise itself. For Nye, such capacity for introspection fundamentally enhances a nation’s attractiveness, legitimacy and reliability’ (Watanabe & McConnell, 2008: xiii; see also Watanabe, 2006). Again, this is a useful criterion to measure China’s success (or lack of it) for the leadership in Beijing has not readily demonstrated any capacity for national self-criticism.

                For Taiwan, deciding who ‘we’ are is difficult, and the design of successful public diplomacy strategies is understandably constrained by reluctance at all levels of the government to confront this issue. The particular political and strategic environments that I outlined earlier and within which Taiwan must work limit discussion about identity. How can Taiwan project an image of Taiwan until Taiwan knows what Taiwan is? Until this can be resolved internally it is difficult to conceive how Taiwan’s public diplomacy and soft power can progress.

Tentative Conclusions 

The definition of soft power is contested; unless we try to de-westernise the concepts of soft power and public diplomacy, we are mired in an essentially American approach that fails to acknowledge very clear cultural differences in their understanding and application. Hence, this project requires a more nuanced analysis of soft power ‘with Chinese characteristics,’ and one might add with ‘Taiwanese characteristics.’ Although soft power works alongside hard power, it is possible to argue that a country’s location within the international system and its possession of hard power resources are still more significant than its soft power capacity. In the case-studies that inform this research project, we see how diplomatic recognition infers legitimacy and authority, and therefore provides the conditions for a more convincing source of soft power.

                How should Taiwan capitalise on its two primary soft power resources, namely: (i) that it is a democracy; and (ii) it is not the PRC? One of the essential conditions is a recognition that Taiwan needs to be more pro-active in first understanding its soft power advantages, and in developing a strategy of public diplomacy that will capitalise on its advantages. One of the most disturbing observations I have made in thirteen years of researching Taiwan’s international communications is the passivity of diplomats, especially among those charged with the responsibility for selling Taiwan to the international community. In representative offices around the world there is almost a collective shrug of the shoulders: What can we do? No-one knows us, no-one cares, why should we bother? They are largely correct; few people either know or care.  This means Taiwan needs to concentrate on the few who do care and do know – the last three feet – as they are possibly the opinion formers in their own country.

                Moreover, Taiwan needs to decide on the Taiwan brand and ensure there is a consistent message that is centrally co-ordinated and is part of a comprehensive diplomatic strategy that is integrated with Taiwan’s foreign policy architecture. This is why it is a serious mistake to disband the Government Information Office and locate its functions within an expanded Ministry of Culture. We have seen all too clearly the effects of Washington’s decision to tear down the USIA and locate public diplomacy within the State Department. As we know, diplomacy, public diplomacy and soft power must be integrated, but they are not synonyms.

                China’s challenges are different: it is not yet clear if China has the capacity to convert its public diplomacy and resources and effort into achievable foreign policy aspirations. China bestows upon its distinct approach to public diplomacy an extraordinary amount of hard and soft power – in selling Chinese language and culture; in humanitarian assistance; and in persuading its neighbours of China’s commitment to a stable, peaceful and prosperous Asia-Pacific.

                China’s economic and commercial power is undeniable; and it makes China an attractive destination for global investment and entrepreneurship. However, convincing the liberal-democratic international community to look beyond trade and economics and to accept China as a credible diplomatic and strategic power is a considerable challenge for China’s public diplomacy. Cultural and economic diplomacy neither easily nor necessarily translate into foreign policy success.     

                The principal problems for public diplomacy are the contradictions in Chinese foreign policy. On the one hand, China yearns to be part of an independent world and to spread the benefits of political, economic and cultural engagement with China. On the other hand, Chinese political discourse is often characterised by a fierce nationalist rhetoric that is reinforced by the Communist Party’s determination to maintain authoritarian rule. Together with China’s apparently unconditional friendship with regimes considered a threat to international stability, and the use of military threat against Taiwan and Tibet, this undermines the idea that Chinese soft power is all about selling national and cultural values. Hence Taiwan – the first Chinese democracy – should be able to challenge China – an authoritarian political system – in dimensions of soft power. Why it is unable to do so is the question at the core of this research project.

               

References  

Batora, J. (2006), ‘Public Diplomacy Between Home and Abroad: Norway and Canada,’ Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol.1.

Callaghan, W. A. (2009), China: The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford: OUP).

Chan, G. (1997), ‘Taiwan as an Emerging Foreign Aid Donor: Developments, Problems, and Prospects,’ Pacific Affairs, 70(1).

deLisle, J. (2010), ‘Soft power in a hard place: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait Relations and US Policy,’ Orbis, 54(3).

Henrikson, A. (2005), ‘Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: The Global ‘Corners’ of Canada and Norway,’ in J. Melissen (ed.), The New Public Diplomacy (New York: Palgrave).

Lukes, S. (2005), ‘Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds,’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 33(3): 477-493.

Mattern, J.B. (2005), ‘Why “Soft Power” Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies, 33 (3).

Nye, J. (2004), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Cambridge, MA.: Public Affairs).

Nye, J. (2008), ‘Forward’, in Y. Watanabe & D.L. McConnell (eds.), Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe)

Rawnsley, G. (1999), Taiwan’s Informal Diplomacy and Propaganda (Basingstoke: Macmillan)

Snow, N. (2009), ‘Rethinking Public Diplomacy,’ in N. Snow and P.M. Taylor (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (London & New York: Routledge)

Stiglitz, J.E. & L.J. Blimes (2008), The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (New York: W.W. Norton)

Watanabe, Y. & D.L. McConnell (eds.) (2008), Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe)

Watanabe, Y. (2006), ‘Revisiting Soft Power’, Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership’, http://www.cgp.org/index.php?option=article&task=default&articleid=342, accessed 26 April 2010.

Womack, B. (2005), ‘Dancing Alone: A Hard Look at Soft Power,’ in Japan Focus, available at http://japanfocus.org/products/details/1975, accessed 22 April 2010.

           

               

        

[1] The research will be conducted in summer 2011 during a visit to Taiwan, funded by Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fellowship Programme. During my visit I will be hosted by the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University, Taipei. 

[2] As the Indian author and politician, Dr Sashi Tharoor, has claimed, hard power is exercised; soft power is evoked. Symposium on Indian Soft Power, organised by the India Media Centre, University of Westminster, 18 February 2011.

[3] ‘With its high growth rate, sectoral transformation and rise to the top echelon of global trading entities beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, Taiwan emerged as a paragon of successful development and an exemplar of the East Asian model of rapid industrialization’ (deLisle, 2010: 20).

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