What's in a name? Or why the BBC should stop referring to the 'so-called' Islamic State

In my last blog, The medium is not the message, I took issue with an argument in Jared Cohen's piece for Foreign Affairs (November/December 2015):

'... governments should consider working with the news media to aggressively publicize arrests that result from covert infiltration of the Islamic State's online network'.

The medium is not the message. In counterinsurgency the message - its design, its credibility and its reception - depends on the language used and the way the language conveys the themes decided by the source. It is possible to argue that before we begin to understand how to defeat modern terrorism, we need to appreciate the importance of discourses, narratives and language in determining how modern terrorism works, how terrorist groups define themselves and are defined by others; and therefore attention to discourses and language  must be central in any strategy designed to confront terrorism. This is particularly crucial when religion and ideology are invoked as justifications for terrorist activity. Success or failure can often depend on the use of a particular word or phrase.      

My response to Cohen was far from ambiguous: 'The day that governments in liberal-democracies work with the news media', I argued, 'is the day the terrorists have won, for it is a clear violation of the objective and independent journalism that should govern how news media work. It is the media's job to scrutinise governments, to hold them to account for their actions, not to "work with them", aggressively or otherwise'.

BBC journalists are routinely violating the very principles they, in other circumstances, justifiably cherish and have defended certainly since the General Strike of 1926, if not since the very foundation of the organisation in 1922. 

A disturbing trend has crept into BBC journalism over the past several months, and that is a predilection for calling the terrorist group the 'so-called Islamic State'. The use of the qualifier 'so-called' is mistaken, counter-productive, and politically very questionable. 

Like it or loathe it, the Islamic State calls itself Islamic State; that's its name. It is proper to question whether this terrorist organisation represents Islam, and we should confer upon Muslim communities across the world the power to decide whether or not IS’s claim to represent their religion is right and justified. Similarly, it is correct to judge whether IS really is a 'state' at all. It certainly does not demonstrate any of the attributes that we normally associate with states, and IS is not recognised by any sovereign state or the United Nations, so its claim to the term is indeed questionable. But these are discussions that should and must occur without journalists announcing in news bulletins their own verdicts.   

The most crucial reason why BBC journalists should refrain from employing the pronoun 'so-called' in their stories about IS is that its use entails a value judgement; and BBC journalists are not in the business of value judgements. 

In June 2015, a cross-Party group of MPs, backed by the Prime Minister, accused the BBC of legitimising IS by using its name in its reporting. The BBC resisted any change: The Director-General, Tony Hall, said that the broadcaster must remain 'impartial'. But the BBC decided that a qualifier was legitimate, and a spokesman said 'We ... use additional descriptions to help make it clear we are referring to the group as they refer to themselves, such as "so-called" Islamic State.'   

According to Webster’s dictionary, the first definition of 'so called' is 'popularly known or called by this term'. But its second meaning is more relevant in this case, namely 'inaccurately or questionably designated as such' which may give the impression that the speaker has formed a judgement about the veracity of the words that follow.  

By using the pronoun 'so-called', the BBC tacitly accepts the government's agenda and can be accused of engaging in anti-IS propaganda on the government’s behalf. The term undermines the credibility of a world-class news organisation, when maintaining the credibility of the BBC is absolutely essential to counter the narratives of terrorist organisations, as well as authoritarian states. It challenges the very operational values of the BBC and thereby the principles of journalism in a democratic society. ‘So-called’ may suggest to its critics that they are right to question the BBC’s independence, while damaging efforts by journalists throughout the authoritarian world to expand the distance between the news media and government.

Yes, the organisation's claim to be an, or even the, Islamic State should be contested and defied at every opportunity. This challenge should form part of the counter-narrative that will form a credible assault against IS's commanding propaganda strength. But BBC news bulletins are not the appropriate location from which to launch this assault. If a pronoun must be used, the BBC may try using 'the group known as the Islamic State,' or 'self-proclaimed/self-styled Islamic State'. These are more reasonable qualifiers that draw attention to doubts about the organisation's claim, highlight very clearly from where the name comes from (the organisation itself), and still challenge its legitimacy to that name without undermining the BBC’s journalistic integrity.   

The medium is not the message: Digital Counterinsurgency

The November-December 2015 issue of Foreign Affairs includes an article by Jared Cohen titled 'Digital Counterinsurgency: How to Marginalize the Islamic State Online'.

Too many essays that claim to provide a blueprint on how to confront IS online do so through a detailed examination of the technology and a renewed emphasis on policing the internet. Cohen's essay is no different. From 'suspending the specific accounts responsible for setting strategy and giving orders to the rest of its online army' to 'banning users who break the rules and distribute terrorist content', we are asked to consider a range of techniques that might lead to IS being marginalised in cyberspace and force the group to the so-called Dark Web.

The article is flawed in two important respects:

First, it claims that there is a direct correlation between the number of 'foreign recruits' (c.20,000, 'nearly 4,000 of whom hail from Western countries') and IS propaganda: 'Many of these recruits made initial contact with the Islamic State and its ideology via the Internet. Other followers, meanwhile, are inspired by the group's online propaganda to carry our terrorist attacks without traveling to the Middle East'. Cohen continues: 'Every day the group's message reaches millions of people, some of whom become proponents of the Islamic State or even fighters for its cause'. If this was a student essay, I would ask the author: Where is your evidence for such claims? Can you substantiate the idea that 'many' (a far too vague and meaningless word) IS fighters from abroad are seduced by propaganda? How many are the 'some' to which you refer out of the 'millions' the propaganda reaches?

Understanding how propaganda works and, perhaps most importantly in this case, its limitations is the key to analysing its impact; and any serious analyst of of propaganda would answer that it cannot change minds or alter behaviour, but rather latches on to, and exaggerates, existing or latent emotions, beliefs and ideas. There is more to understanding the IS terrorist than the seductive power of propaganda, and most helpful will be understanding the context in which the propaganda is both produced and received.

Second, the article raises, but fails to address in sufficient detail the ethical and legal consequences of its recommendations. Who decides what is a terrorist, and even an IS social media account? Who decides, and by what criteria, which messages are considered 'extremist', inflammatory or dangerous?  Cohen treads on even more dangerous ground when he suggests 'governments should consider working with the news media to aggressively publicize arrests that result from covert infiltration of the Islamic State's online network'. The day that governments in liberal-democracies work with the news media is the day the terrorists have won, for it is a clear violation of the objective and independent professionalism that should govern how news media work. It is the media's job to scrutinise governments, to hold them to account for their actions, not to 'work with them', aggressively or otherwise.

Finally, the article fails to discuss in any meaningful detail not only the message that may help to marginalise IS - on and offline - but also the political action that may help to isolate the terrorists and understand why young Muslims choose to join such terrorist organisations in the first place. Some of the issues we need to consider include:

(a) White middle class men explaining what Islam is and is not; what the Koran says and does not say; and what the Koran means. The condemnation of Islamic terrorism must begin in Islamic communities themselves. This means avoiding mass messaging in favour of community-based dialogue and discussion, and giving Muslim communities the tools to combat radicalisation themselves.

(b) Not listening to the Muslim voice. Governments must do more to engage with Muslim communities, and actually hear what they are saying. What inspires young Muslims to travel to Syria and join ISIS? Is it simply for the thrill? The promise of glory and status? A sense of brotherhood? To punish the west for their crimes against Islam? To escape deprivation at home? Or because they truly believe in an Islamic Caliphate?  Only when we truly understand why IS is able to recruit in such numbers - and there will be many explanations - can western governments begin to tackle the problem. We know some young Muslims are being radicalised: the important question is not how, but Why? This may mean governments having to rethink policy, at home and abroad, because states are judged by the credibility and legitimacy of their actions, not their words.

Focusing on policing social media and dreaming up ever more innovative methods of controlling the internet is one solution, but it is not necessarily the only nor perhaps the best solution. In combating the evil of IS terrorism, governments need to pay far more attention to their own propaganda message, how it is delivered, by whom and to whom; and actively engage in a more intimate way Muslim communities who may hold in their hand both an explanation for, and an answer to, the crisis we face.  

Sara Khan: British Muslim Girls and Extremism

In my last blog, Baronness Warsi: "British Muslims will only speak up for British values when they know they will be heard", I observed the need for greater engagement, inclusiveness, listening and trust-building among British Muslims. On 29 March 2015, The Observer published another thought-provoking and significant essay by Sara Khan, co-director of Inspire:* 'British Muslims girls and extremism: what I learned on my journey across the UK' (British Muslim girls and extremism). Khan provides a logical progression of Baronness Warsi's ideas and takes them to the next level. I will list the main points as they relate to the broader theme of strategic communications:

1.  There is 'no uniform Muslim community'. Poor engagement fails to understand that Islam is a faith of many denominations, and our tendency to homogenise British Muslims blinds us to the 'diversity and complexity of views' within communities. That is understandable: governments and the media (especially the media) prefer simple problems and simple solutions. But in this case ignorance amplifies the problem and obstructs the creation of acceptable and legitimate solutions.

2.  Language and education are important. Sara Khan discovered generational divides which prevent communication between parents and children. This extends beyond language to different 'Cultural, religious and gender expectations' between the generations. Moreover a lack of theological knowledge among the older generations means that children seek answers about their faith from elsewhere:

Inevitably, some of these children go online to find their answers - and extreme websites are there awaiting their curiosity. Many teenagers feel their parents are not credible authorities; mothers, for their part, told us they were unaware of what educational resources existed to challenge extremist ideology.   

3.  The climate of fear since 2001 has impacted on the way Islamic youth see themselves, their community and their relationship to the UK: 'There is an identity crisis of the 9/11 generation, children who have grown up under a spotlight of suspicion, affecting their sense of belonging'. I have argued elsewhere that knee-jerk reactions by governments to the threat of domestic extremism can have negative effects on relationships with Muslim communities.  

4.  The possible consequences are enormous: 'This ... leaves the mosques to fill the gap. ... [M]any women felt that some mosques were ill-equipped to teach counter-narratives with any confidence'. Some mosques have said this is not their responsibility, rather it must take place in the home.

5. There has been what Sara Khan describes as 'pushback', and she describes how imams have moved to the virtual world to engage with younger Muslims. In London, scholars and imams gathered to launch an online magazine, Haqiqah (The Truth), designed to answer questions about faith, explain verses from the Koran and counter the simple ISIS narratives. Imamsonline.com is also a source of information and and a place for dialogue (imamsonline.com). Using Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube imamsonline.com provides links to discussions and information on 'culture', 'chaplaincy', 'civic faith' 'interfaith' issues and 'community engagement', all important themes in reclaiming Islam as a peaceful religion. This makes communication timely, accessible and, most important, relevant for the audiences most vulnerable to extremist messages.  

6.  Sara Khan does not shy away from identifying problems within the Muslim community, and focuses on the position of women: 'These women know that challenging extremism also means standing up to patriarchy and gender roles that have the contribution of women in both home and public life'. Women, says Khan, lack confidence to engage with institutions, such as the police, 'Partly because of a lack of trust; partly a lack of engagement and dialogue.' But trust will only be created through greater levels of engagement and dialogue - through actively listening to and hearing the voices of these communities, and discussing with them problems and their possible solutions.

Sara Khan concludes 'Empower women to counter extremism and it is they who will take on this battle'. Although she ends her essay, 'this is not a "community" challenge', clearly the roots of trust and credibility lie within the communities themselves, their grassroots work and through initiatives such as Haqiqah and imamsonline.com. As I have argued in previous posts on this subject, government and state agencies must do much more to bring these grassroots activists and community workers into the conversation about the problems facing Muslims in the UK today, and to work together in partnership with organisations like Inspire ('empowering women, strengthening societies') to combat radicalism among the young.

*Inspire is a counter-extremism and human rights organisation - wewillinspire.com



 

Baroness Warsi: 'Muslims will speak up for British values only when they know they will be heard'

The Observer has published an extremely important and perceptive article by Baroness Warsi, former Minister of State for Faith and Communities ('Muslims will speak up for British values ...'). When few British politicians and members of government - representing whichever party - have little understanding of the basic principles of communication, public diplomacy and the need to engage with aggrieved and marginalised communities, Baroness Warsi reveals herself an astute critic of current policies towards the UK's Muslim population.

The first problem she identifies is 'non-engagement': '

For nearly six years, firstly under Labour and then the coalition, governments have adopted a policy of non-engagement with a wide range of community organisations and activists. Many groups and individuals have been defined as "beyond the pale". Indeed, the coalition even set up a high-level committee to decide whether a group or individual was someone ministers could engage with.

In other words, there is not only evidence of a clear policy of exclusion, thus dividing further the very communities one wishes to reach out to, but what are the criteria for exclusion? Who decides which organisations are beyond the pale and according to which criteria? This should only be decided in consultation with members of the Muslim communities themselves. Only they will know which groups should and should not be included in dialogue, and by involving them in a conversation the government would be increasing the legitimacy of their policies.

Baroness Warsi then uses two words that are the core of any credible and successful public diplomacy  strategy: friendship and trust. As we know, building trust among your audience is crucial for both credibility and legitimacy. Baroness Warsi refers to friendship and trust when recounting the response to a letter sent by the Communities Secretary, Eric Pickles (whom I remember very well as the leader of Bradford City Council when I was growing up there in the 1980s) to more than 1000 mosques:

A letter out of the blue to a mosque that is potentially affiliated to an organisation like the Muslim Council of Britain - with whom the government has refused to engage - creates a climate where even the most benign of correspondence can become toxic.   

She then uses another word that is familiar to all of us researching and teaching public diplomacy:

It makes it appear as if the government is neither listening not genuine in its intentions. And it provokes a negative response, irrespective of the true motive. 

Listening is the key activity in any communication strategy. For one thing, listening to the very communities you wish to engage means you have a greater insight into how the members of those communities think and form opinions which can then inform your own communications with them. Listening also provides the basis for empathy and understanding that might make for better policy-making. It helps build trust, but unfortunately Baroness Warsi sees the persistence of a 'trust deficit':

We needed to bring more people into the fold rather than increasingly adopt positions which pushed groups and individuals out to the fringe. We will fight extremism better if we all feel like we are in the same team, where communities feel listened to, where answers are found collectively and where engagement with communities is broad and deep.      

I have written previously on the need for a more inclusive approach to relations with the UK's Muslim communities, and the urgency of downplaying the belligerent knee-jerk reactions that have encouraged the creation of a military-sounding 'taskforce' to 'confront' extremism (British Taskforce to confront extremism; A Marked Man in America). Baroness Warsi's perceptive understanding of the problems - residing mainly within government, rather than within the Muslim communities - and her approach to their solution, based on engagement, inclusiveness, listening and building trust, suggests that she is best placed to form a new strategy towards Islam in the UK.

British Taskforce to 'Confront' Extremism

The British press are now following the creation by the government of a taskforce 'aimed at confronting Islamic extremism and controlling preachers of hate' (The Times, 3 June 2013, p.4). All the reports on this story and the speeches by the senior members of the government responsible for its creation reflect a decidedly belligerent position; the very label 'taskforce' resonates with military symbolism (and reminds me of the use of 'crusade' after 9/11), while the involvement of the security and intelligence forces demonstrates clearly the thinking behind its design. The framing echoes both the disastrously-named War on Terror and Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations.

In all the talk of this taskforce and its aims, priorities and methods, one word has been noticeable by its absence: engagement; and I do wonder which members of the taskforce have the required expertise to advise on communications strategies that go beyond knee-jerk reactions such as closing down websites, monitoring social media, and trying to curb 'hate speech'. Who is suggesting methods of engaging with Muslim communities and their young members before they can be radicalised? Who is talking with young Muslims about the problems they face and the reasons why fundamentalism might be attractive to them? Is the taskforce prepared to spend as much time listening as confronting? Of course we need to deal with the violence and terror (and I hope that the taskforce may also extend its remit to challenging the rise of the racist Far Right which is equally extremist, dangerous and frightening), and it is important to acknowledge that with free speech comes responsibility (neither incitement nor hate-speech should be considered rights). However, it is also necessary to understand that the militarism of the taskforce may itself be a symptom of the problem, not a cure.

I refer readers back to one of the first blogs I posted in 2011, A Marked Man in America, about the work of a Muslim cleric, Yasir Qadhi, among young members of the Islamic community. I concluded that posting with these words: 'If the US [public diplomacy] and anti-terrorism communities wish to make inroads, they must embrace Qadhi and others like him who can challenge the militant narratives and prevent the radicalisation of the disaffected youth'. I sincerely hope that a British Qadhi has been appointed to the taskforce and can persuade its members to drop their current militaristic and reactive position and consider engagement as a more effective long-term strategy.

One definition of soft power:

'a slower, surer, more civilized way of exercising influence than crude force'

('Playing Soft or Hard Cop,' Economist, 19 January 2006).

 

Islamism and Propaganda

In the middle of the last decade I heard the term 'Islamism' for the first time, and this sparked an abiding interest in the discourses that have helped define the so-called War on Terror. There is a huge literature on this subject, and almost all observe how language has justified both the terrorist attacks themselves and the response to them. Most famous is President George W. Bush's reference to a 'Crusade' in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 which not only brought to the surface particular belligerent and anti-Muslim images of the US's response to the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, but also played into Al-Qaeda's hands by using the very narratives which the terrorist organisation exploits throughout its propaganda.

One of the issues I have been thinking about for a long time - and I post my thoughts and questions here in the wake of the intensive coverage of current events in Mali in the hope of getting feedback and clarification - is the insistence by western media and politicians to use the term 'Islamist' instead of 'Islamic' or 'Muslim' to refer to specific groups of Muslims seeking a non-peaceful way of imposing their beliefs. As a student of propaganda I am aware of the emotional and intellectual reaction to 'isms', and one cannot help but wonder whether the ubiquitous and rather arbitrary use of the label 'Islamist' after 9/11 is justified. One did not hear this term used so widely before 2001.

Labels are the easiest form of propaganda: they provide a shorthand, the basis for a simple and emotional reaction to often complex ideas, and therefore help reinforce stereotypes. By describing fundamentalist Muslim groups as Islamist, are audiences persuaded by the very label in a headline to view them in a particular way even before they have heard or read the rest of the story? The natural equation of Islamism with Communism and Fascism provokes the perception of an ideology determined to refashion on totalitarian grounds not only the state and political institutions, but culture, society and man. 

As far as I understand the difference, Islam refers to a faith whereas Islamism refers to a specific political ideology which advocates the sovereignty of divine law and the creation of an Islamic state. It privileges Islamic law within national boundaries, and does not confine law to the personal realm or as a matter of faith and personal responsibility. This means the extension of Islamic law to all people living within a particular national territory, regardless of whether they are Muslim, Christian or Jewish. It offers no policy-making agenda as Islamism is not future-oriented; rather, it is embedded in the past glories of Islam and the historical mistreatment of Muslims. The past justifies the present.

Islamism is in essence the politicisation of Islam, and the word is often used in conjunction with 'militant' or 'fundamentalist' to emphasise its distance from law abiding paths to power. However, such terms also help reinforce the beliefs of  those who, like Samuel Huntington, foresee an inevitable 'Clash of Civilizations'. They help to make Muslims the 'other'  and suggest that 'we' respect legal and democratic paths to government, unlike 'them' who use 'militant' or 'fundemantalist' ways of achieving and exercising power; and when successful they govern in a way that is completely incompatible with western secular understandings of, and approaches to, politics. Islamists become dangerous entities, exercising power in 'rogue states', responsible for human rights abuses and ultimately for the global terrorist threat. So in Mali 'we' support Muslims; 'we'
fight against Islamists. The power of the Egyptian Brotherhood in Egypt has raised concerns about Islamism there and has forced 'the West' to question, as does Foreign Policy magazine, whether 'we' made a mistake in letting the Brotherhood win (in democratic elections that were demanded by the international community. You can't advocate the sovereignty of the people and then criticise the very same people if they elect someone to power you don't like). 

Casual use of the term 'Islamism' or 'Islamist' is a useful propaganda device, and like all propaganda devices, the more we hear it, see it and use it in a cavalier fashion, the more value it acquires as propaganda. The complexity and the precision of the meaning is lost. It also serves as a way of reducing the divisions within Islam to easily-packaged and digestible soundbites. Islam becomes an homogeneous unit, and the very real theological and geographical differences between Muslims or Islamists are conveniently overlooked. You are either a 'good' Muslim or a 'bad' Muslim.

My intention here is not to judge the accuracy or otherwise of the perceptions of Islamists; nor do I wish to defend Muslims or Islamic states which engage in human rights abuses or are compliant with terrorists, just in the same way I do not wish to defend any government, religion or secular movement which threatens, cajoles or is intolerant of any other people or creed. Rather, I wish to bring to the table my own thoughts on the use of the term Islamism and the way its imprecise application by the media can be a valuable tool of propaganda and helps demonise groups and individuals. I know very little about Islamism, and so I hope that some of the readers for this blog will respond and help me understand better this interesting and important issue. I look forward to your comments.                                

A Marked Man in America

A Marked Man in America

Waiting in Montreal airport on Sunday I decided to read a wonderful article in the New York Times magazine (20 March 2011). It is called ‘A Marked Man in America’ by Andrea Elliott and tells the story of a Muslim cleric, Yasir Qadhi. Below the headline Elliott summarised the article thus:  ‘To prevent violent extremism in the US, the Muslim cleric Yasir Qadhi says he must talk openly to his young followers about Jihad. But can that word even be part of the conversation?’  I had just spent the last five days discussing public diplomacy almost non-stop, and so I think my pd adrenaline was in full flow, meaning my antenna were attuned to the public diplomacy significance of everything I read, saw or heard. Elliott’s article is available here http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/magazine/mag-20Salafis-t.html and is well worth studying in detail.

The following are some quotations from the article with my own thoughts added for free.

First the report recounts how American policy – both at home and overseas – has damaged the trust of American Muslims and has thus had disastrous consequences for the presentational aspects; as we know policy and presentation go hand-in-hand, and it is important to deal with the first before you attempt to repair the second.   

The report describes the American Muslims ‘who have come of age after 9/11. They have watched as their own country wages war in Muslim lands, bearing witness – via satellite television and the internet – to the carnage in Iraq, the drone attacks in Pakistan and the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo. While the dozens of Al Maghrib students I interviewed condemned the tactics of militant groups, many share their basic grievances.’

This connects with another paragraph later on in the article: The American Muslims listening to Yasir Qadhi ‘had heard it before: vote, educate your neighbours, protest peacefully. But is that what Islam commands when your people are dying? … One of the deepest Islamic principles is that of the ummah – the global community that unites all Muslims. The Prophet Muhammad was said to have likened it to a human body. If one part hurts, the whole body aches.’

In addition to demonstrating the connection between policy and presentation, these passages reveal issues that resonate with Muslims (especially young, disillusioned Muslims) and which are developed in the communications strategies of the Islamic terrorist organisations. It also indicates why the treatment of Muslims abroad is such a powerful narrative among Muslims in the US. The question becomes: How to respond?

The issue becomes more urgent the more one reads of the so-called ‘trophy photos’ – photos of American soldiers allegedly ‘murdering’ Afghan civilians’ published in Der Spiegel - which could be ‘more damaging than Abu Ghraib’. Any response that centres on pd and/or strategic communications is undermined and irreparably damaged by the revelation of such atrocities.  

The article then describes divisions within the Islamic movement between militant and non-militant not only concerning responses to American policy in the Middle East and treatment of Muslims at home, but also nuanced theological questions such as the meaning and necessity of Jihad. Militant clerics, such as the American preacher Anwar Awlaki who is believed to be with Al-Qaeda in Yemen ‘has taken to the internet with stirring battle cries directed at young American Muslims. “Many of your scholars,’ Awlaki warned last year, are “standing between you and your duty of jihad.” … Who has the greater credibility: the cleric living comfortably in America or the militant “in the cave” who sacrificed everything for his beliefs? … Many of the students had grown up listening to him preach on CDs.

A little further in the article I found this significant passage:  ‘Law-enforcement officials say that there was no policy singling out Salafis.’ In the aftermath of 9/11 they were ‘rushing to root out a new enemy, with little time to grasp the theological differences separating nonviolent fundamentalists from the creed of the hijackers. … Anwar al-Awalki was still preaching in Virginia when federal agents raided 15 local Islamic offices and homes. “It’s a war against Muslims and Islam,” Awlaki bellowed in an audio address. “It’s happening right here in America.”

Needles to say, when American policy fails, such messages gain credibility.    

Elliott then turns her focus back to Qadhi and his popularity: ‘He has more than 10,000 fans on Facebook, hundreds of sermons on Youtube and a growing Twitter following. … it is his unapologetic comfort with America  - his assertion that Muslims belong here as much as anyone – that has also made him a point of pride for many young Salafis.’  

This is important for pd: not only does it demonstrate Qadhi’s ease with social media (thus making him accessible to the most vulnerable and impressionable sections of society), but he is also an opinion former – a crucial step in the ‘last three feet’ of public diplomacy. More importantly, he is an American Muslim proclaiming the protection of American values. He does not seek to overthrow the government, merely to safeguard the rights of all Muslims in America. Therefore his identity is an important link in the pd chain.

The article names a ‘young blogger from North Carolina,’ Sami Khan ‘who eventually moved to Yemen and now runs the Al Qaeda magazine, Inspire’. I found this particularly interesting and hunted down a story about the launch of the magazine in English:  http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/10/06/al-qaedas-first-english-language-magazine-is-here/59006/

Elliott’s conclusions to her article are prescient:

‘Qadhi’s ambiguous relationship with the government reflects a quandary facing the Obama administration: whether to engage with Muslims across the ideological spectrum.’

That seems like a no-brainer ….

‘As the administration confronts domestic radicalization, some government analysts say they have much to learn from clerics like Qadhi. “We’re trying to get our arms around how to engage with Yasir and people like him,” a senior counterterrorism official told me.’

Engagement with ‘Yasir and people like him’ is absolutely essential. Not only does he represent a generation of American Muslims who can speak to American Muslims on their own terms and as American Muslims, but he also demonstrates that the ‘one size fits all’ approach of US policy does not work. It is no longer enough to identify theological splits within Islam – Sunni and Shia etc. – but one must also learn to understand the issues that separate militant from non-militant Islam and learn how they radicalise young Muslims.  Most important of all, the US has to learn that its policies in the Middle East and Afghanistan and its treatment of Muslims at home damage the credibility of any US efforts at engagement. As my old friend and mentor Philip Taylor once remarked: ‘credibility is like virginity; once it has gone, you can never get it back.’ The worry is that the recent publication of the ‘trophy photos’ will again counteract the significant work started by Yasir Qadhi. If the US pd and anti-terrorism communities wish to make inroads, they must embrace Qadhi and others like him who can challenge the militant narratives and prevent the radicalisation of the disaffected youth.