BBC Interview with Xu Lin about Confucius Institutes

The BBC's Shanghai correspondent, John Sudworth, has interviewed Xu Lin, the head of Hanban which is the state ministry responsible for China's Confucius Institutes. An edited version of the interview can be viewed here Interview with Xu Lin.

This is an extraordinary interview on many levels, not least Ms Xu's response to questions about her blatant interference in an academic conference earlier this year. I wrote a post about this incident as one of several 'public diplomacy faux pas', accessible here When to say nothing.

What is most surprising in this interview is not what she said in defence of the Confucius Institutes. Like any government minister across the world, Ms Xu is required to provide an official response to critical questions. Rather, most alarming is her logic: John Sudworth has no right to ask questions about Taiwan because it is a Chinese issue and only the Chinese can address it. This was an entirely inappropriate answer to the question of why she had ripped promotional material about the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation from the programme of an academic conference. It makes no sense in the context of the interview and undermines the more positive tone of her answers to other questions. It also provides the framing for the interview and means that any review will focus on the more dramatic and confrontational portion of the interview, rather than the substance. John Sudworth's decision to post online Ms Xin's request for him to to edit out altogether the question about the conference in Portugal and his refusal to do so means that this and not the cultural diplomacy of the Confucius Institutes become the story. Thus Xu Lin revealed that the Chinese government has much to learn about how the media work, and any claims of communication professionalism among government officials are premature. The interview was yet another public diplomacy faux pas.    

Moreover, Ms Xu resorted to complaining she had not been given in advance any question about the conference in Portugal and therefore refused to answer. This was her chance to explain and, dare we say, even apologise for her violation of academic freedom earlier this year. Any critic seeking evidence of how Confucius Institutes are not simply agents of cultural diplomacy and language teaching will find it here: Xu Lin not only refused to answer difficult questions, she also politicised the Confucius Institutes and reinforced the idea that they are led by dogmatists.

Just as we are assured that China's government communications machinery is becoming more professional, more sensitive to the demands of the modern media age, Xu Lin's interview tells a different story. It does little to reassure viewers that Confucius Institutes are not required to pursue a political agenda decided in Beijing.  The interview is a crowning end to a year in which Chinese public diplomacy has taken one step forward and two steps back.

China: When To Say Nothing

Few governments spend as much on their international outreach - what one might call 'soft power' - than China; and few governments get it wrong so spectacularly and so frequently. The main explanation for this lack of success is the failure to understand the first lesson of public diplomacy: Actions always speak louder than words; and that sometimes, saying or doing nothing is the most strategic course to take.

The discussion about how China's behaviour, at home and abroad, undermines its public diplomacy among the international community has a long history. The literature on China's soft power refers repeatedly to how China's record on human rights, democracy, the treatment of dissidents, and freedom of speech, as well as its behaviour towards Tibet and Xinjiang, challenge the more positive narratives that Beijing prefers to project in its international communication. And yet it seems that the Chinese government has difficulty in grasping that its response to adverse events and criticisms may also have negative consequences for its public diplomacy. In 2014 three events in just two months nurture this critical perspective.

The first event occurred in London on 4 June 2014, the 25th anniversary of the suppression by the People's Liberation Army of the protests in Beijing's Tiananmen Square. Two women, one of whom was Wang Ti-Anna, the daughter of a democracy activist, were shoved away from the Chinese embassy in London by staff who also threw to the ground the flowers the two women wished to leave on the steps ... and this happened in front of television news cameras from across the world. This not only indicates that staff in the embassy fail to understand how public diplomacy works - do not react in ways that will inflame the situation and give journalists the story they seek; if in doubt say and do nothing - but it also suggests that embassy staff had to be seen, by their superiors inside the building or in Beijing, to be doing something, even if it results in bad publicity. You can see the BBC's footage of the event here: Chinese embassy in London

A second related event occurred on 18th August 2014. Clive Palmer, a member of the Australian Parliament, launched a tirade on live television against China and the Chinese. His vile, offensive and racist language has been reported all around the world and has given Palmer more international publicity than he deserves. The Chinese embassy in Canberra should have been advised to issue a statement condemning Palmer and his remarks, but reassuring Australians that the Chinese government recognises he was not speaking for all Australians; that Australia remains an important and friendly country to China; and that relations would not be disrupted by the inanity of one man's comments. That is diplomacy. Instead, China's state-owned newspaper, the Global Times, decided to respond in its English language edition with its own excessive zeal, claiming that Palmer 'serves as a symbol that Australian society has an unfriendly attitude towards China'.  The editorial continued by recommending that Australia 'must be marginalized in China's global strategy'. Again such ill-advised rhetoric only inflames further the situation, demonstrates that China's public diplomacy is neither as sophisticated nor as sensitive as Beijing would like to think, and shows yet again that China is unable to respond in a rational way to criticism. Rather, the government decided to generalise about a whole country from the ramblings of one man, something the Chinese repeatedly accuse westerners of doing about China. Clearly the Chinese government and its embassies need better advice on how to handle the international media. You can see Palmer's outburst here: Clive Palmer and read the Global Times article here Global Times.

The third event is more sinister and perhaps undermines China's soft power more than the other two incidents put together. On 22 July 2014 at the annual conference of the European Association for Chinese Studies in Portugal, China's Vice-Minister Xu Lin, Director-General of the Confucius Institutes, impounded all copies of the conference programme and refused to release them until organisers removed pages she deemed offensive. What was so distasteful for Xu was an acknowledgement in the programme that part of the conference was sponsored by Taiwan's Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) Foundation. Several pages including an advertisement for the CCK Foundation were ripped from a programme which the Confucius Institute had no role in funding. In a published statement (statement) the President of the EACS, Roger Greatrex, said: 'Providing support for a conference does not give any sponsor the right to dictate parameters to academic topics or to limit open academic presentation and discussion, on the basis of political requirements'. At a time when the role of Confucius Institutes - long celebrated as a shining example of China's public and cultural diplomacy - is being scrutinised closely and debated across the world, but especially in the US, Xu Lin could not have picked a worse time to assert her imaginary authority. It is not surprising that headlines in western media adopted critical, sometimes hostile language in reporting and commenting on this news: "Censorship at the China Studies Meeting" (Inside Higher Education); "China fails the soft power test" (China Spectator); "Beijing's Propaganda Lessons: Confucius Institute officials are agents of Chinese censorship" (Wall Street Journal). Academic institutions will now have reason to be more suspicious of Confucius Institutes, while those who have long suspected their political agenda will have far more credibility.

The lesson here for China is very clear: Think before you speak; think before you act. What you do in response to something that you may find unfavourable or even offensive may backfire and ultimately undermine the credibility of your soft power campaign. When in doubt, say and do nothing.      

An interesting few days in Chinese soft power

Phil Seib of the USC Centre on Public Diplomacy has published an interesting blog on Chinese soft power (http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newswire/cpdblog_detail/the_first_soft-power_superpower/). I share Phil's assessment of China's exercise of soft power and its public diplomacy strategy.

Phil's posting comes at the end of a very interesting week which I think clearly reveals a degree of confusion in Beijing about what soft power is, how it works and what the government would like to achieve by exercising it.

We witnessed a minor victory for China in persuading the US State Department to reverse a ruling on accreditation that would have had serious consequences for the work of the Confucius Institutes. Needless to say the major Chinese newspapers were extremely vocal in protest (though the escape of Chen Guangcheng's brother, Chen Guangfu, received no coverage). It is interesting to consider whether this reversal (as it was described by the Chinese media) by the State Department represents the impact of hard power on soft power in that traditional diplomatic institutions are engaged in dispute about the architecture of their soft power strategies(?) There is clearly an interaction taking place here that deserves further consideration. I have not found much coverage of this event in the American media and would welcome from my State-side friends any comments on whether and how this has been reported.     

At the same time, China was extremely critical of the publication in the US of the State Department's annual report on human rights which singled out human rights abuses in the PRC. China's State Council Information Office almost immediately hit back by publishing its own Human Rights Record of the United States in 2011. More information is available here http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-05/26/content_15391823.htm. While of course China is both entitled and correct to point out the double standards in US discourse, to do so in response to the publication of the US's report reveals the PRC's insecurity and lack of confisence in its growing stature; the reactive and defensive nature of China's ppublic diplomacy; and perhaps most importantly, it demonstrates that China has still not learned that being able to tolerate (even if you cannot accept) international criticism is a major asset in soft power terms.

The final interesting development over the last week was the visit by 51 ambassadors and ministers from 49 countries to the Publicity Department. Not surprisingly the official Chinese media reported how the visitors had enjoyed their visit, had asked many interesting questions and learned a lot (see  http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-05/25/content_15383436.htm). Of course diplomats would not say anything else in fear of insulting their hosts. What is important here is that the visit took place at all: the Publicity Department is the English name for the Propaganda Bureau of the Communist Party which is located in an unmarked building next to the seat of power in Beijing, Zhongnanhai. This seems to be another step in China's determination to convert (at least for foreign audiences) propaganda into public diplomacy.

By far the best description of the structure and inner working of the Propaganda Bureau/Publicity Department is Anne-Marie Brady's Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (2009).   

Despatches from Taiwan 4: The Taiwan Academies

My final blog from Taiwan in 2011. Today, my article about the Taiwan Academies appeared in the Taipei Times newspaper (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2011/09/14/2003513215).

As a close observer of Taiwan’s public diplomacy for almost twenty years, I recognise the government’s intentions in this area and respect them. Taiwan is in a very difficult international situation and must struggle to be heard by a world that on the whole chooses to avoid listening to it. In such an environment, public diplomacy must remain an instrument of Taiwan’s foreign policy. In the absence of hard power – diplomatic recognition, international legitimacy and membership of the most important international organisations – and with a contested sovereignty that involves a bigger and more powerful neighbour, Taiwan will only survive and prosper by devoting more attention and resources to the study and application of ‘soft power.’  

                However, my research has revealed a fundamental flaw within Taiwan’s current public diplomacy strategy, and this is the over-dependence on culture (and traditional Chinese culture) as the dominant theme in international communications and engagement. Following this is the proposal that Taiwan should create the Taiwan Academies to help project this culture, teach traditional Chinese characters and history, and hence generate interest in the island. This, however, is a false logic. I suggest that the Taiwan Academies will not add any value or benefit to current endeavours, and will certainly not alleviate the many serious problems facing Taiwan in the international arena.

The first reason is this proposal demonstrates how Taiwan is trying to run before it can walk. Despite all the excellent work of the Government Information Office (which needs reorganising, not abolishing), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Council of Cultural Affairs, and the Taiwan Tourism Bureau, I am sad to say that few members of the public across the world either know or care about Taiwan. Many would have great difficulty locating Taiwan on a map. Why does the government think that the Taiwan Academies will make any difference? If no-one knows where Taiwan is, why would they seek out and engage with the Academies? Before Taiwan begins to think about creating anything resembling the Academies, it is essential to first make sure the world is aware of Taiwan and starts to know its story.

                The second reason the Taiwan Academies are a bad idea is the most important: They will be in direct competition with the PRC’s Confucius Institutes. The government and the civil service may assure me that this is not the case, and I concede that this it is not Taiwan’s intention to engage in such competition. However, in the realm of public diplomacy, sometimes the intention is less significant than the message, and it is certainly less important than the perception of actions among global audiences.  For the international community the Taiwan Academies are a direct competitor with the Confucius Institutes, and whatever the government says to the contrary will not make the slightest difference. This perception will make competition the story, and Taiwan’s good intentions will be ignored. Once again, Taiwan will be seen as lacking innovation and will be accused of simply riding the coat-tails of the PRC. (Why did the Taipei Floral Expo use almost exactly the same five mascots as the 2008 Beijing Olympics? Did no-one spot the similarity and consider how this would project a negative image of Taiwan?)

                The Taiwan Academies are a symptom of a larger and more serious problem in Taiwan’s public diplomacy that has revealed itself during my 2011 research. Taiwan is currently telling the wrong story to the world. By emphasising culture as the priority in the public diplomacy strategy – Taiwan as the preserver of traditional Chinese culture – Taiwan is missing the opportunity to define itself and tell a more exciting and relevant story that would generate international interest. Taiwan is the first Chinese democracy. It has experienced one of the smoothest and most successful political transitions in Asia and is today a vibrant challenge to the crazy idea that democracy is somehow inimical to Asian or Chinese culture (the nonsense of the so-called ‘Asian Values’ theory). Remember that whatever happens or does not happen in the PRC – whether China marches forward to democracy or retrenches under internal pressures and fervent nationalism – Taiwan will always be the first Chinese democracy. How this happened is a fascinating and often moving story, but where is it being told? Who is telling it? It may come as a surprise to learn that few people across the world are interested in the history and calligraphy of traditional Chinese characters (and how many visitors to the exhibitions being organised around the world know the difference between traditional and simplified characters?). Culture must be part of a more holistic strategy; it has an important and strategic role to play and certainly helps to define Taiwan. However, it is not the whole story and should not be the entire focus of Taiwan’s public diplomacy strategy. In the struggle to define Taiwan, in the noble efforts to identify what is unique and different about this island, the current strategy is deliberately ignoring the one narrative that makes Taiwan stand out and differentiate it from the PRC. To repeat, Taiwan is the First Chinese Democracy.

                Moreover, Taiwan is not ‘the heart of Asia’ despite claims in the new advertising campaign. Every country in Asia claims it is the true heart of the continent (think ‘Malaysia, truly Asia’). ‘Touch your Heart’ was a far more successful brand. It suggests warmth, friendship, intimacy, the promise of a genuinely touching experience. ‘The heart of Asia’ tells us nothing, promises nothing. Taiwan no longer stands out from the crowd. Moreover, by changing the brand, Taiwan has destroyed the brand-familiarity among the audience, the result no doubt of many years and a considerable amount of finance.

                Taiwan has many opportunities to improve its public diplomacy, to persuade the world that this is a vibrant, modern, democratic society. Taiwan has an envious amount of “soft power” capital at its disposal because of its recent history (not because of ancient Chinese history – the PRC has that market cornered and Taiwan cannot compete). This involves telling a political and social, rather than a cultural story. By creating the Academies, Taiwan is suggesting that it knows nothing about itself – what makes this island a unique and fascinating place. Moreover, it reveals that Taiwan neither knows nor cares about its target audience (a fatal error), preferring instead to believe that your audience will accept whatever you give them. Above all, Taiwan is creating a narrative which suggests Taiwan is (at best) competing with and (at worst) copying the PRC and its Confucian Institutes. It is not too late to face the facts: the Taiwan Academies are a bad idea, and it would be in Taiwan’s long term interest to abandon their creation immediately.

Confucius Institutes #1

I have called this Confucius Institutes #1 because I am sure there will be much, much more to say here given the attention these Insitutes are receiving. I have yet to be convinced of the CIs, either in terms of source (their close relationship with the Chinese government makes throws some doubt on their credibility) or in terms of audience (is there any evidence of their success? Are they having any influence beyond the developing world?). I think it is still too early for me to make any sound conclusions on this but will continue to try to discover more. Every year at least one of my MA students writes a dissertation about the CIs, which gives me an opportunity to learn more about them.

But I have just come across this story on Xinhua's website 'Senior CPC official urges Confucius Institute to contribute to China-Armenia friendship' (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-04/12/c_13824072.htm). What you may not know when you read this article is that not only is Li a member of the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo Standing Committee, he is also the Party's propaganda chief ....