I was drawn to two articles in the Guardian today. The first is an excellent interview by Polly Toynbee with Aung San Suu Kyi (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/16/interview-aung-san-suu-kyi-polly-toynbee). Toynbee describes how Aung San 'has just learned of mutinies in army bases [in Burma] from the BBC World Service, a lifeline when information is so hard to come by. She is relieved the BBC's Burma service has been saved from British government cuts, "puzzled" at the decision to cut the Chinese service. After 70 years, the BBC's last Mandarin programmes for China have just been broadcast.'
Aung San Suu Kyi is not the only one who is 'puzzled' by this decision as China scholars and activists will testify. The British government claims that fewer Chinese are listening to the BBC and are preferring to access news and information from the internet. However, it is far too naive to base decisions that affect 1.4 billion people, many of whom live in poverty, are uneducated and reside in areas where internet access is difficult (not to mention the problem that users who are not technologically sophisticated face in breaching the 'Great Firewall') on such a questionable assumption. Besides, what happens when the Chinese decide to limit or completely stop access to the internet in areas or situations experiencing serious unrest? To whom will people turn for information and news if the BBC and VoA have ceased broadcasting in Mandarin?
One can begin to appreciate the force of the arguments proposed by Evgeny Morozov in his provocative book, The Net Delusion in which he suggests not only the folly of Net optimists who believe that the internet will liberate mankind, but also the way that governments, like Star Trek's Borg, adapt to new communications environments and technologies - assimilate them, if you will - for their own advantage.
This is demonstrated in another Guardian article which reports the activities of 'cyber activists' in Syria (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/15/syria-activists-protests-in-view). One activist who spreads news and information on social media 'receives regular death threats on his Facebook and Twitter accounts from what he believes are Syrian security agents'. After his sister was arrested, Syrian security posted a message on his wall: "You have until midnight tonight to announce your withdrawal from the Syrian revolution or we will get her." And yet the cyber-activists in Syria remain committed to the cause and to the importance of using the social media (incuding Youtube) to share information.
This leads me to a conclusion that is neither original nor surprising, but perhaps too simple for some governments in this age of austerity to understand: isn't there room and need for both old and new media? The new media represents a new-style of activism, mobilisation and method of P2P communication; but old broadcasting media are also required. The BBC Mandarin Service has built over decades a reputation among its audience for accuracy and credibility, and there is a clear relationship based on trust between broadcaster and audience (public diplomacy is all about relationships, after all). To abandon such relationships in the mistaken belief that they are antiquated and no longer required in order to save money is a mistake. Both the Foreign Office and USIA throughout their histories have believed they could turn language services on and off like a tap, only to find that when they are needed again, it is not that easy to rebuild audiences and reputations.
Perhaps when Aung San Suu Kyi speaks on such issues, the British and American governments would do well to listen.
Saturday, 16 April 2011
Monday, 11 April 2011
US to fund Sesame Street remake for Pakistan
USAid is spending $20m to remake Sesame Street for audiences in Pakistan. The location will be a 'lively village ... with a roadside tea and snacks stall ... some fancy houses with overhanging balconies along with simple dwellings, and residents hanging out on their verandas' (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/07/sesame-street-pakistan). The series will feature characters tailor-made for the audience (including Rani, the child of a peasant farmer), and will be broadcast in Urdu and 56 regional languages. The Guardian reports that 'The show will have strong female characters and carry an implicit message of tolerance, but will feature no pro-American propaganda or overt challenge to hardline religious sentiment. ... The Pakistani Sesame Street could turn out to be the most visible American aid project in Pakistan in recent years'.
This is not the first time that Sesame Street is remade for local audiences: by 2006 there were 20 co-productions in countries all over the world, each one addressing local audiences with local characters, locations and issues relevant to the audiences. The first HIV-positive Muppet, Kami, was created in 2003 to help address South Africa's AIDS epidemic.
In 2011 Sesame Street returns to China in the form of 52 11-minute Chinese episodes of Sesame Street: Big Bird Looks at the World (Zhima Jie: Da Niao Kan Shijie) broadcast on Haha TV, which reaches Shanghai’s population of roughly 18.5 million. This follows Sesame Street's presence at the Shanghai Expo where Big Bird joined expo mascot Haibao to present a Magic Map Show.
I am not aware of any serious study of Sesame Street and public diplomacy, but it does seem an excellent example of promoting American soft power through aid and education. Meanwhile, because each co-production is created around local needs, characters, locations and issues, it helps to dismiss the nonsense of cultural imperialism that refuses to go away in many academic debates about international communications. There are some who will criticise USAid's involvement and claim that this undermines the credibility of the programme. But remember these are co-productions that would not be possible without the involvement of local programmers; and when it comes to a child's education, does it really matter? Localisation would not be possible (especially in China) if there was a suggestion that the programmes would be a vehicle for the promotion of US values. Let's hope these new ventures are a success.
This is not the first time that Sesame Street is remade for local audiences: by 2006 there were 20 co-productions in countries all over the world, each one addressing local audiences with local characters, locations and issues relevant to the audiences. The first HIV-positive Muppet, Kami, was created in 2003 to help address South Africa's AIDS epidemic.
In 2011 Sesame Street returns to China in the form of 52 11-minute Chinese episodes of Sesame Street: Big Bird Looks at the World (Zhima Jie: Da Niao Kan Shijie) broadcast on Haha TV, which reaches Shanghai’s population of roughly 18.5 million. This follows Sesame Street's presence at the Shanghai Expo where Big Bird joined expo mascot Haibao to present a Magic Map Show.
I am not aware of any serious study of Sesame Street and public diplomacy, but it does seem an excellent example of promoting American soft power through aid and education. Meanwhile, because each co-production is created around local needs, characters, locations and issues, it helps to dismiss the nonsense of cultural imperialism that refuses to go away in many academic debates about international communications. There are some who will criticise USAid's involvement and claim that this undermines the credibility of the programme. But remember these are co-productions that would not be possible without the involvement of local programmers; and when it comes to a child's education, does it really matter? Localisation would not be possible (especially in China) if there was a suggestion that the programmes would be a vehicle for the promotion of US values. Let's hope these new ventures are a success.
Friday, 8 April 2011
Another US Deficit: China and America Public Diplomacy in the Age of the Internet
I have just started to read this report to the US Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations (16 February 2011), available via my website: http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=gdr&requesttimeout=500&folder=99&paper=1571
What strikes me in the first few pages that I have read is how reactive this document is. The report is suggesting that because Chinese public diplomacy is well-resourced and appears quite successful in particular parts of the world, American public diplomacy is somehow 'falling behind' and needs to catch-up: China does A, 'we' need to do A x 2. In short, the report expresses a horse-race attitude to the practices it describes.This is a peculiar attitude towards public diplomacy and soft power which should be designed around foreign policy objectives, not who is perceived to be more popular or whose public diplomacy is attracting more government resources. In the sections I have read so far, the report has concentrated only on shortfalls in America's public diplomacy capacity (hence the title's reference to a 'deficit'), and this is a serious mistake; bean-counting will only get you so far before the absence of a clear strategy built around clear objectives inhibits further pd progress.
Perhaps this is the real deficit(?)
Does the US really want to start playing a tit-for-tat game with China and thus risk losing credibility? More in future posts when I have read more of the report ...
What strikes me in the first few pages that I have read is how reactive this document is. The report is suggesting that because Chinese public diplomacy is well-resourced and appears quite successful in particular parts of the world, American public diplomacy is somehow 'falling behind' and needs to catch-up: China does A, 'we' need to do A x 2. In short, the report expresses a horse-race attitude to the practices it describes.This is a peculiar attitude towards public diplomacy and soft power which should be designed around foreign policy objectives, not who is perceived to be more popular or whose public diplomacy is attracting more government resources. In the sections I have read so far, the report has concentrated only on shortfalls in America's public diplomacy capacity (hence the title's reference to a 'deficit'), and this is a serious mistake; bean-counting will only get you so far before the absence of a clear strategy built around clear objectives inhibits further pd progress.
Perhaps this is the real deficit(?)
Does the US really want to start playing a tit-for-tat game with China and thus risk losing credibility? More in future posts when I have read more of the report ...
Friday, 1 April 2011
The Summaries of World Broadcasts: A Unique Archive
I am so happy I found this article that I published in History Today magazine in 1993. I had been using the Summaries of World Broadcasts, housed at the BBC Written Archive Centre, for my PhD research and discovered they are a wonderful source of information and insight for the contemporary historian. Given the importance of understanding the role of all source analysis in the construction of modern foreign policy, including public diplomacy, the SWBs continue to have significant relevance.
A unique archive
by Gary Rawnsley
As historians we are taught that secondary sources are useful for our research, but on their own are not enough, and so we must turn to first-hand accounts and primary sources to provide the substance of our investigations. For most this involves frequent visits to the Public Records Office at Kew, and this is usually considered sufficient. However there are other less well-known archives which few consult, but which can effectively complement the PRO. One example is the BBC Written Archives Centre at Caversham Park, near Reading. Contrary to popular academic belief this is of use not only to scholars of the BBC but to anyone engaged in researching the post-second World War period of international history, since the Written Archives Centre is the home of the Summaries of World Broadcasts (SWBs), a rich depository of historical information.
The SWBs are a daily digest of foreign radio broadcasts (in the age of satellite, television is now also included) as received and collated by the nearby BBC Monitoring Service. They are divided into four parts to cover the principal geographical areas of the world, and each is supplemented weekly by a detailed economic report. They are then sold to 'customers', ranging from government departments and university libraries to interested companies and individuals.
Despite being established at the beginning of the Second World War, the BBC Monitoring Service came of age during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91. Recognised as the single comprehensive source of news and intelligence on what was happening inside Iraq, it finally achieved the worldwide fame it has long deserved. As a result, scholars of both the history of that crisis, and the role of the media in it, are beginning to use the SWBs to supplement and augment their analyses. One notable example is Philip M. Taylor in War and the Media (Manchester University Press, 1992). Taylor represents a new generation of political and diplomatic historians who accept that communication has assumed a dominant role in the conduct of international relations and thus interprets the events that have shaped global history over the past fifty years from a new perspective and understanding.
The value of the SWBs is heightened by the fact that they provide the government and the Foreign Office with a regular flow of information, particularly when traditional channels have been severed. This does not, of course, negate the important work conducted by diplomatic personnel stationed overseas which the Monitoring Service complements. In crisis situations, however, diplomatic relations are often cut off and legations are closed. In such circumstances the Monitoring Service can be the only source of news and information which is derived from both international broadcasting stations (often transmitted in the knowledge that they will be monitored and reported) and domestic transmissions (providing more substantial information and less propaganda, since they are intended to be received by the home audience only).
In 1993 historians have turned their focus towards the events of thirty years ago as revealed by the newly-opened government records at Kew. Research now underway will no doubt spawn many excellent historical studies of, for example, the event that dominated 1962 -- the Cuban Missile Crisis -- which will disclose much of interest that has never before been known. But the crisis also provides excellent opportunity to demonstrate how the official record can be supplemented by the picture of events as treated by the media of the time. Indeed, the Missile Crisis is a dramatic testament to the diplomatic importance attached to both international radio communication and the Monitoring Service.
At the height of the crisis, Khrushchev sent two messages to President Kennedy offering a resolution. The first, ignored by Kennedy, was sent via traditional channels and thus experienced a long delay in its transmission from the US embassy in Moscow. The SWBs show how Khrushchev surmounted this problem by relaying his second message over Radio Moscow, guaranteeing that American demands would be complied with. He did this, fully aware that at such a critical moment when time was precious, this message would be monitored and reported long before official diplomatic communiques reached the White House. Kennedy replied using the same method and for the same reason. In this way international broadcasting had undertaken a significant role, in defusing the most threat to the Cold War status quo.
What is most interesting, however, is that through a detailed reading of the monitoring reports for the period, historians can trace the events of the crisis from a new angle. What Radio Moscow had to say about American allegations of Russian missiles in Cuba, for example, reveals the lengths to which the Soviet Union was prepared to go to deny their presence. Often more significant is what was not said, and what this indicated in terms of a Soviet political response. Then, when Moscow finally acknowledged the presence of the missiles in Cuba, the SWBs suggest how they would be justified.
Most frightening, of course, are the threats of nuclear confrontation that litter the broadcasts. Notwithstanding the problem of ascertaining the credibility of such threats, a young researcher examining the events from a post-Cold War vantage point can understand just how close the world came to witnessing nuclear confrontation. The crisis can then be examined in its international context. At a time when Sino-Soviet relations were beginning to deteriorate, how did China respond to the Cuban Missile Crisis? And how did Cuba itself react to being used as a mere pawn in a superpower game of global chess? The SWBs show how Khrushchev was hailed as a hero by some, a reckless adventurer by others, and a capitulator by Castro. Moreover, how aware were the rest of the world of just how close the superpowers came to unleashing nuclear war? How did the media reflect this concern? Analysing the SWBs goes some way towards providing answers to these and similar questions.
Unlike government documents housed in overseas archives the SWBs are written in the English language, which can be useful to the researcher. However, critics may be concerned as to the accuracy of the translations and the fact that, as many languages are so precise, with the very tone of a spoken phrase having its own unique nuance, such translations are not reliable. There is no doubt that the monitors who work at Caversham, and the compilers of the SWBs, are aware of this potential problem but are skilful enough to cope; many of the monitors are, after all, working in their first language.
Historical research, however, does not have to be confined to the events of thirty years ago. Through the SWBs we can begin to piece together the jigsaw of the momentous changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe; broadcasts received at Caversham signalled both the downfall of the Ceausescu regime in Romania and the coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in the autumn of 1991. For the latter a reading of the SWBs provides not only a detailed chronological account of the coup itself, but also confirmation that it was destined to fail. This is suggested by the way the format of broadcasts from Radio Moscow changed over the period. For example, while the first twelve hours of the coup were inevitably occupied by decrees and statements issued by the so-called State Emergency Committee, and sombre material music evoking memories of the succession of deaths of Soviet leaders in the early 1980s, in the evening the news reader allowed herself to lapse from the usual strict and formal style adopted by presenters to announce at such a critical juncture in the nation's history: 'And that is the end of the news from the World Service of Radio Moscow on this beautiful summer's evening.' By the second day, reports had restored a level of balance, including coverage of the resistance by ordinary Russians to the coup, the actions and statements of Boris Yeltsin, and condemnation of the events by John Major and George Bush. This is most significant when one recalls that the media had theoretically been placed under the control of an 'especially created central body'.
The BBC Monitoring Service is currently collating volumes of invaluable information concerning the ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Moreover the fragmentary evidence made available by the SWBs as a series, allows the end of the Cold War and the shaping of the New World Order to be surveyed and, in turn, suggests where our political focus may shift in the near future. The basis for this speculation would not be simply prediction, but an academic interpretation and analysis of the world's media; they are the first to report events and situations, often without knowledge of their import or significance. The historians of the future will no doubt benefit from the progress made today towards such ends.
It is time then that more historians began to delve into this unique source of information. It is no less valuable than more traditional sources, and offers exciting new research possibilities. In isolation the Summaries of World Broadcasts present an opportunity to study individual situations from the viewpoints of the main participants and a chance to see how the media reflects the political responses to world events. Together the Summaries are an indication of the growing importance attached to the media in the political life of the planet.
A unique archive
by Gary Rawnsley
As historians we are taught that secondary sources are useful for our research, but on their own are not enough, and so we must turn to first-hand accounts and primary sources to provide the substance of our investigations. For most this involves frequent visits to the Public Records Office at Kew, and this is usually considered sufficient. However there are other less well-known archives which few consult, but which can effectively complement the PRO. One example is the BBC Written Archives Centre at Caversham Park, near Reading. Contrary to popular academic belief this is of use not only to scholars of the BBC but to anyone engaged in researching the post-second World War period of international history, since the Written Archives Centre is the home of the Summaries of World Broadcasts (SWBs), a rich depository of historical information.
The SWBs are a daily digest of foreign radio broadcasts (in the age of satellite, television is now also included) as received and collated by the nearby BBC Monitoring Service. They are divided into four parts to cover the principal geographical areas of the world, and each is supplemented weekly by a detailed economic report. They are then sold to 'customers', ranging from government departments and university libraries to interested companies and individuals.
Despite being established at the beginning of the Second World War, the BBC Monitoring Service came of age during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91. Recognised as the single comprehensive source of news and intelligence on what was happening inside Iraq, it finally achieved the worldwide fame it has long deserved. As a result, scholars of both the history of that crisis, and the role of the media in it, are beginning to use the SWBs to supplement and augment their analyses. One notable example is Philip M. Taylor in War and the Media (Manchester University Press, 1992). Taylor represents a new generation of political and diplomatic historians who accept that communication has assumed a dominant role in the conduct of international relations and thus interprets the events that have shaped global history over the past fifty years from a new perspective and understanding.
The value of the SWBs is heightened by the fact that they provide the government and the Foreign Office with a regular flow of information, particularly when traditional channels have been severed. This does not, of course, negate the important work conducted by diplomatic personnel stationed overseas which the Monitoring Service complements. In crisis situations, however, diplomatic relations are often cut off and legations are closed. In such circumstances the Monitoring Service can be the only source of news and information which is derived from both international broadcasting stations (often transmitted in the knowledge that they will be monitored and reported) and domestic transmissions (providing more substantial information and less propaganda, since they are intended to be received by the home audience only).
In 1993 historians have turned their focus towards the events of thirty years ago as revealed by the newly-opened government records at Kew. Research now underway will no doubt spawn many excellent historical studies of, for example, the event that dominated 1962 -- the Cuban Missile Crisis -- which will disclose much of interest that has never before been known. But the crisis also provides excellent opportunity to demonstrate how the official record can be supplemented by the picture of events as treated by the media of the time. Indeed, the Missile Crisis is a dramatic testament to the diplomatic importance attached to both international radio communication and the Monitoring Service.
At the height of the crisis, Khrushchev sent two messages to President Kennedy offering a resolution. The first, ignored by Kennedy, was sent via traditional channels and thus experienced a long delay in its transmission from the US embassy in Moscow. The SWBs show how Khrushchev surmounted this problem by relaying his second message over Radio Moscow, guaranteeing that American demands would be complied with. He did this, fully aware that at such a critical moment when time was precious, this message would be monitored and reported long before official diplomatic communiques reached the White House. Kennedy replied using the same method and for the same reason. In this way international broadcasting had undertaken a significant role, in defusing the most threat to the Cold War status quo.
What is most interesting, however, is that through a detailed reading of the monitoring reports for the period, historians can trace the events of the crisis from a new angle. What Radio Moscow had to say about American allegations of Russian missiles in Cuba, for example, reveals the lengths to which the Soviet Union was prepared to go to deny their presence. Often more significant is what was not said, and what this indicated in terms of a Soviet political response. Then, when Moscow finally acknowledged the presence of the missiles in Cuba, the SWBs suggest how they would be justified.
Most frightening, of course, are the threats of nuclear confrontation that litter the broadcasts. Notwithstanding the problem of ascertaining the credibility of such threats, a young researcher examining the events from a post-Cold War vantage point can understand just how close the world came to witnessing nuclear confrontation. The crisis can then be examined in its international context. At a time when Sino-Soviet relations were beginning to deteriorate, how did China respond to the Cuban Missile Crisis? And how did Cuba itself react to being used as a mere pawn in a superpower game of global chess? The SWBs show how Khrushchev was hailed as a hero by some, a reckless adventurer by others, and a capitulator by Castro. Moreover, how aware were the rest of the world of just how close the superpowers came to unleashing nuclear war? How did the media reflect this concern? Analysing the SWBs goes some way towards providing answers to these and similar questions.
Unlike government documents housed in overseas archives the SWBs are written in the English language, which can be useful to the researcher. However, critics may be concerned as to the accuracy of the translations and the fact that, as many languages are so precise, with the very tone of a spoken phrase having its own unique nuance, such translations are not reliable. There is no doubt that the monitors who work at Caversham, and the compilers of the SWBs, are aware of this potential problem but are skilful enough to cope; many of the monitors are, after all, working in their first language.
Historical research, however, does not have to be confined to the events of thirty years ago. Through the SWBs we can begin to piece together the jigsaw of the momentous changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe; broadcasts received at Caversham signalled both the downfall of the Ceausescu regime in Romania and the coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in the autumn of 1991. For the latter a reading of the SWBs provides not only a detailed chronological account of the coup itself, but also confirmation that it was destined to fail. This is suggested by the way the format of broadcasts from Radio Moscow changed over the period. For example, while the first twelve hours of the coup were inevitably occupied by decrees and statements issued by the so-called State Emergency Committee, and sombre material music evoking memories of the succession of deaths of Soviet leaders in the early 1980s, in the evening the news reader allowed herself to lapse from the usual strict and formal style adopted by presenters to announce at such a critical juncture in the nation's history: 'And that is the end of the news from the World Service of Radio Moscow on this beautiful summer's evening.' By the second day, reports had restored a level of balance, including coverage of the resistance by ordinary Russians to the coup, the actions and statements of Boris Yeltsin, and condemnation of the events by John Major and George Bush. This is most significant when one recalls that the media had theoretically been placed under the control of an 'especially created central body'.
The BBC Monitoring Service is currently collating volumes of invaluable information concerning the ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Moreover the fragmentary evidence made available by the SWBs as a series, allows the end of the Cold War and the shaping of the New World Order to be surveyed and, in turn, suggests where our political focus may shift in the near future. The basis for this speculation would not be simply prediction, but an academic interpretation and analysis of the world's media; they are the first to report events and situations, often without knowledge of their import or significance. The historians of the future will no doubt benefit from the progress made today towards such ends.
It is time then that more historians began to delve into this unique source of information. It is no less valuable than more traditional sources, and offers exciting new research possibilities. In isolation the Summaries of World Broadcasts present an opportunity to study individual situations from the viewpoints of the main participants and a chance to see how the media reflects the political responses to world events. Together the Summaries are an indication of the growing importance attached to the media in the political life of the planet.
Thursday, 24 March 2011
Say Taiwan!!
Here is an interesting way that Taiwan is promoting itself
http://taiwanroc100.tw/100homestay_en/default.aspx
Hosted by the Council for Cultural Affairs, this initiative invites 'foreign guests' to apply for the chance to win an all-expenses paid trip to Taiwan to celeberate the one hundredth anniversary of the Republic of China. In return, guests are required to blog, tweet and post on Facebook their impressions of life in Taiwan. The webpage states the following:
This seems like an excellent pd initiative and represents Taiwan's strengths. It is a valuable example of citizen diplomacy and P2P relationship building which can often be the most effective method of international communication. It does, however, raise a couple of issues in my mind:
First, how is this being advertised beyond a small community of people around the world already interested in Taiwan? There is scope here for broader engagement, but there does not seem to be any way around the dilemma that few people know or care about Taiwan. I only know about this initiative because of my research interests and my involvement in a China-related email discussion group. How to sell this beyond a core constituency?
Second, like other examples of citizen or P2P diplomacy this is a brave initiative for it removes control of the message from the government/state/pd agencies and locates it with the 'people'. Are they on message? How can the Taiwan government/should the Taiwan government try to maintain a positive image if the message is designed and disseminated by non-Taiwanese visitors?
If done correctly, I think this is a method of pd that Taiwan should develop and expand. It overcomes issues of resources, and while the PRC takes a very broad-brush approach to pd (via broadcasting and wasting money on CCTV 9 and Xinhua TV) this initiative demonstrates (i) Taiwan's embrace of social media (presenting a youthful, dynamic and energised self-identity that will resonate with the youthful target audience); and (ii) that Taiwan understands the need to build relationships between people, not just between governments and people. I look forward to exploring these issues further when I am conducting my fieldwork in Taipei this summer.
http://taiwanroc100.tw/100homestay_en/default.aspx
Hosted by the Council for Cultural Affairs, this initiative invites 'foreign guests' to apply for the chance to win an all-expenses paid trip to Taiwan to celeberate the one hundredth anniversary of the Republic of China. In return, guests are required to blog, tweet and post on Facebook their impressions of life in Taiwan. The webpage states the following:
To celebrate the centennial founding of Republic of China (Taiwan), the Council for Culture Affairs Republic of China (Taiwan) will be holding the “Republic of China (Taiwan) International Youth Week - Centennial Homestay” event- by inviting 250 international guests to Taiwan to experience the authentic lifestyle of the warm-hearted Taiwanese people.
The event aims for the international guests to find out a lot more about Taiwan and its influence on the world and at the same time, to experience the good nature of the Taiwanese culture. This event encourages international guests to travel all around Taiwan, noting down their travel experiences and share them on social media (i.e. Facebook and Twitter) so people around the world can find out more about the culture and the friendliness of the Taiwanese people.
The international guests and the world will be able to witness Taiwan’s various achievements after 100 years of development, sharing the joy of the centennial founding of Taiwan. This will open the door for the rest of the world to have more interaction with the Taiwanese people.
This seems like an excellent pd initiative and represents Taiwan's strengths. It is a valuable example of citizen diplomacy and P2P relationship building which can often be the most effective method of international communication. It does, however, raise a couple of issues in my mind:
First, how is this being advertised beyond a small community of people around the world already interested in Taiwan? There is scope here for broader engagement, but there does not seem to be any way around the dilemma that few people know or care about Taiwan. I only know about this initiative because of my research interests and my involvement in a China-related email discussion group. How to sell this beyond a core constituency?
Second, like other examples of citizen or P2P diplomacy this is a brave initiative for it removes control of the message from the government/state/pd agencies and locates it with the 'people'. Are they on message? How can the Taiwan government/should the Taiwan government try to maintain a positive image if the message is designed and disseminated by non-Taiwanese visitors?
If done correctly, I think this is a method of pd that Taiwan should develop and expand. It overcomes issues of resources, and while the PRC takes a very broad-brush approach to pd (via broadcasting and wasting money on CCTV 9 and Xinhua TV) this initiative demonstrates (i) Taiwan's embrace of social media (presenting a youthful, dynamic and energised self-identity that will resonate with the youthful target audience); and (ii) that Taiwan understands the need to build relationships between people, not just between governments and people. I look forward to exploring these issues further when I am conducting my fieldwork in Taipei this summer.
Wednesday, 23 March 2011
A Marked Man in America
A Marked Man in America
Waiting in Montreal airport on Sunday I decided to read a wonderful article in the New York Times magazine (20 March 2011). It is called ‘A Marked Man in America’ by Andrea Elliott and tells the story of a Muslim cleric, Yasir Qadhi. Below the headline Elliott summarised the article thus: ‘To prevent violent extremism in the US, the Muslim cleric Yasir Qadhi says he must talk openly to his young followers about Jihad. But can that word even be part of the conversation?’ I had just spent the last five days discussing public diplomacy almost non-stop, and so I think my pd adrenaline was in full flow, meaning my antenna were attuned to the public diplomacy significance of everything I read, saw or heard. Elliott’s article is available here http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/magazine/mag-20Salafis-t.html and is well worth studying in detail.
The following are some quotations from the article with my own thoughts added for free.
First the report recounts how American policy – both at home and overseas – has damaged the trust of American Muslims and has thus had disastrous consequences for the presentational aspects; as we know policy and presentation go hand-in-hand, and it is important to deal with the first before you attempt to repair the second.
The report describes the American Muslims ‘who have come of age after 9/11. They have watched as their own country wages war in Muslim lands, bearing witness – via satellite television and the internet – to the carnage in Iraq, the drone attacks in Pakistan and the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo. While the dozens of Al Maghrib students I interviewed condemned the tactics of militant groups, many share their basic grievances.’
This connects with another paragraph later on in the article: The American Muslims listening to Yasir Qadhi ‘had heard it before: vote, educate your neighbours, protest peacefully. But is that what Islam commands when your people are dying? … One of the deepest Islamic principles is that of the ummah – the global community that unites all Muslims. The Prophet Muhammad was said to have likened it to a human body. If one part hurts, the whole body aches.’
In addition to demonstrating the connection between policy and presentation, these passages reveal issues that resonate with Muslims (especially young, disillusioned Muslims) and which are developed in the communications strategies of the Islamic terrorist organisations. It also indicates why the treatment of Muslims abroad is such a powerful narrative among Muslims in the US. The question becomes: How to respond?
The issue becomes more urgent the more one reads of the so-called ‘trophy photos’ – photos of American soldiers allegedly ‘murdering’ Afghan civilians’ published in Der Spiegel - which could be ‘more damaging than Abu Ghraib’. Any response that centres on pd and/or strategic communications is undermined and irreparably damaged by the revelation of such atrocities.
The article then describes divisions within the Islamic movement between militant and non-militant not only concerning responses to American policy in the Middle East and treatment of Muslims at home, but also nuanced theological questions such as the meaning and necessity of Jihad. Militant clerics, such as the American preacher Anwar Awlaki who is believed to be with Al-Qaeda in Yemen ‘has taken to the internet with stirring battle cries directed at young American Muslims. “Many of your scholars,’ Awlaki warned last year, are “standing between you and your duty of jihad.” … Who has the greater credibility: the cleric living comfortably in America or the militant “in the cave” who sacrificed everything for his beliefs? … Many of the students had grown up listening to him preach on CDs.
A little further in the article I found this significant passage: ‘Law-enforcement officials say that there was no policy singling out Salafis.’ In the aftermath of 9/11 they were ‘rushing to root out a new enemy, with little time to grasp the theological differences separating nonviolent fundamentalists from the creed of the hijackers. … Anwar al-Awalki was still preaching in Virginia when federal agents raided 15 local Islamic offices and homes. “It’s a war against Muslims and Islam,” Awlaki bellowed in an audio address. “It’s happening right here in America.”
Needles to say, when American policy fails, such messages gain credibility.
Elliott then turns her focus back to Qadhi and his popularity: ‘He has more than 10,000 fans on Facebook, hundreds of sermons on Youtube and a growing Twitter following. … it is his unapologetic comfort with America - his assertion that Muslims belong here as much as anyone – that has also made him a point of pride for many young Salafis.’
This is important for pd: not only does it demonstrate Qadhi’s ease with social media (thus making him accessible to the most vulnerable and impressionable sections of society), but he is also an opinion former – a crucial step in the ‘last three feet’ of public diplomacy. More importantly, he is an American Muslim proclaiming the protection of American values. He does not seek to overthrow the government, merely to safeguard the rights of all Muslims in America. Therefore his identity is an important link in the pd chain.
The article names a ‘young blogger from North Carolina,’ Sami Khan ‘who eventually moved to Yemen and now runs the Al Qaeda magazine, Inspire’. I found this particularly interesting and hunted down a story about the launch of the magazine in English: http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/10/06/al-qaedas-first-english-language-magazine-is-here/59006/
Elliott’s conclusions to her article are prescient:
‘Qadhi’s ambiguous relationship with the government reflects a quandary facing the Obama administration: whether to engage with Muslims across the ideological spectrum.’
That seems like a no-brainer ….
‘As the administration confronts domestic radicalization, some government analysts say they have much to learn from clerics like Qadhi. “We’re trying to get our arms around how to engage with Yasir and people like him,” a senior counterterrorism official told me.’
Engagement with ‘Yasir and people like him’ is absolutely essential. Not only does he represent a generation of American Muslims who can speak to American Muslims on their own terms and as American Muslims, but he also demonstrates that the ‘one size fits all’ approach of US policy does not work. It is no longer enough to identify theological splits within Islam – Sunni and Shia etc. – but one must also learn to understand the issues that separate militant from non-militant Islam and learn how they radicalise young Muslims. Most important of all, the US has to learn that its policies in the Middle East and Afghanistan and its treatment of Muslims at home damage the credibility of any US efforts at engagement. As my old friend and mentor Philip Taylor once remarked: ‘credibility is like virginity; once it has gone, you can never get it back.’ The worry is that the recent publication of the ‘trophy photos’ will again counteract the significant work started by Yasir Qadhi. If the US pd and anti-terrorism communities wish to make inroads, they must embrace Qadhi and others like him who can challenge the militant narratives and prevent the radicalisation of the disaffected youth.
Tuesday, 22 March 2011
Taiwan's soft power and public diplomacy - some preliminary thoughts
Last week I attended the International Studies Conference in Montreal. I wish to post here the paper I presented at the conference; it represents some initial thoughts about my current research on Taiwan and China, and I welcome feedback.
Comparing the Soft Power and Public Diplomacy of China and Taiwan
Gary D. Rawnsley
University of Leeds, UK
Prepared for the annual conference of the International Studies Association
Montreal March 2011
‘There’s something to be said about being small’
(Advertisement for tourism in Taiwan, The Economist, 12-18 June 2010)
The Republic of Taiwan (hereafter Taiwan) has diplomatic relations with just 23 minor powers, and has 92 representative offices in the capitals and major cities of 57 other countries. Taiwan does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with any major powers and is excluded from representation in the United Nations. Although Taiwan has, since 1987, experienced one of the smoothest, peaceful and most successful transitions to democracy in Asia, it remains ostracised by the international community which refuses to recognise its legitimacy.
This paper is a preliminary discussion of ideas generated in preparing a major research project which compares and explains the soft power and public diplomacy strategies of Taiwan and China.[1] The research will attempt to triangulate the approaches developed in international relations, diplomacy studies and international communications to examine and understand how states without diplomatic recognition design and use communications strategies to compensate. Specifically, the project uses Taiwan as the principal case-study of a democratic minor power that soft power theory asserts should be able to communicate effectively with foreign publics, but in reality is meeting little success in doing so because it operates ‘within a distinctive kind of environment’ (Lukes, 2005: 485).
Taiwan is locked within a particular set of political environments that include: relations with Beijing (which maintains that Taiwan is a province of China and has successfully ostracised Taiwan in the international arena) and the US; the absence of formal diplomatic relations with major powers; a contested national identity (which makes the Taiwan ‘brand’ difficult to identify and sell); and democratic electoral competition (which means that in Taiwan, foreign and China policy must be made within the context of public opinion and the awareness of the potential consequences for electoral support). I suggest that the specific context in which Taiwan must survive renders obsolete any attempt to categorise it as a particular-sized power; it is Taiwan’s international position and its relationship (or absence of) with other powers that defines its status.
All governments are confronted with the challenges imposed by their own particular political environments; and these environments have convinced governments that they have to design soft power strategies to survive and prosper. In effect, soft power is considered – erroneously – as a substitute for hard power, and there is a prevailing confidence in the ability of soft power to raise a nation’s profile, prestige and influence.
The question then becomes: Can governments be the architects of their own soft power? Can soft power be strategised? If we acknowledge that soft power is about the attraction of core values, it follows that it is a natural by-product of cultural and political appeal. It is an attraction based on the ideals and principals a government or country values and upholds. The attraction derives from the appeal of the perceived consistency between the message and the how the government behaves. In this scenario, any attempt to strategise and create doctrines for soft power misses the basic point, that it is an ‘intangible attraction’ and therefore beyond the policy-making capacity of cabinets and kings.[2]
The challenge in the next stage is to translate the intangible attributes of soft power into tangible outcomes: how does soft power connect with national foreign policy objectives? How does it contribute to their realisation, and how does a government know when its soft power is working? As Nye (2008: x) has noted: ‘Whether the possession of power resources actually produces favourable outcomes depends on the context and skill of the agent in converting the resources into behavioural outcomes.’ This is where strategic communications, including public diplomacy, begins to assert their presence, for unless there is a visible and recognisable product, it is difficult if not impossible to decide whether or not the resources devoted to communications have been worth the effort. Hence the deed often becomes the most significant and potentially most influential message in public diplomacy (‘actions speak louder than words’):
It is sometimes possible for a country to do very well by being good. To support ‘good works’, to perform ‘good’ deeds, to use ‘good’ words, and to project ‘good’ images can pay off in terms of international prestige, and in even more practical expressions others’ appreciation (Henrikson, 2005: 1).
The principal challenge is that governments and other actors within nation-states may be able to control the design, the message and the transmission of public diplomacy, but they can exercise no comparable control over reception. Hence the design and dissemination are only part of the story. As Mattern (2005) has noted, ‘Attraction is a rather subjective experience, which raises the question of what makes something or someone alluring to some and not to others.’ This is because the message is open to interpretation, but also because audiences may be subject to other internal and external influences – what in communications we call cognitive dissonance – that can affect reception.
All agents involved in international communications must confront this problem, but Taiwan and China must encounter these challenges within specific political frameworks. To understand this, I turn to Nancy Snow’s (2009: 4) list of features that give a country soft power advantage, namely:
- When culture and ideas match prevailing global norms
- When a nation has greater access to multiple communication channels that can influence how issues are framed in global news, and
- When a country’s credibility is enhanced by domestic and international behaviour.
This list sets out very clearly the paradox at the heart of this research, for according to these criteria the People’s Republic of China (PRC) should not be as successful as Taiwan in soft power and public diplomacy terms.
It is possible to argue that the PRC is at a ‘decisive disadvantage’ in all three areas: Beijing has difficulty persuading the liberal-democratic world that China’s agenda is compatible, if not consistent, with the perceived norms and values of democracies; China is only just developing the capacity to frame stories in the global news media, but this remains limited (more information does not necessarily mean better communication, and it is difficult to appreciate how Xinhua’s new global television service will accelerate China’s public diplomacy; the same number of people who don’t watch CCTV International will not watch Xinhua); and China’s domestic and international behaviour has not inspired confidence, though we do have to recognise very clear improvements in Chinese foreign policy and its interaction with international regimes. However, it only takes one episode to undo all this good work which undermines almost in an instant any credibility and soft power capital that the PRC has accumulated in other areas.
In contrast, Taiwan has emerged from forty years of one-party authoritarian rule and is now a strong, maturing liberal democracy which experienced one of the smoothest, most peaceful regime changes in Asia. The people of Taiwan conduct regular free and fair elections, and they have delivered two transfers of political power (thus satisfying Samuel Huntington’s ‘two turnover test’). Moreover, former President Chen Shui-bian was investigated, arrested and jailed on charges of corruption, sending a very clear signal that in modern Taiwan, no-one is above the law. Not only is Taiwan’s domestic and international behaviour a match for the PRC, but by being a democracy its culture and ideas match prevailing norms in at least a large part of the world. It is not surprising that successive regimes have recognised the soft power capital in being a democracy: President Chen and his Vice-President, Lu Hsiu-lien, emphasised Taiwan’s democratic credentials as a major source of the regime’s soft power; and President Ma Yin-jeou has likewise acknowledged the potential power of personifying democratic ideals and values. Meanwhile, Taiwan has long been recognised as a leading economic power – part of the Taiwan ‘brand’ – long before China began its own comprehensive process of economic reform[3]. Yet neither Taiwan’s international strength nor its image positively reflects its credentials. As Gerald Chan (1997: 37) has noted, Taiwan is ‘financially rich, but diplomatically poor.’ Józef Batora (2006: 55) has argued that, ‘for small and medium –sized states, public diplomacy represents an opportunity to gain influence and shape the international agenda in ways that go beyond their limited hard power resources.’
Taiwan has certainly engineered many improvements in its global outreach strategies since I published my first book on the subject in 1999. For example, successive governments in Taipei have moved discourses beyond the Cold War frameworks that defined Taiwan as ‘Free China’ until the end of the 1990s. Ma Ying-jeou’s administration, elected in 2008, has demonstrated a more nuanced understanding of how soft power and public diplomacy work and how they can connect to the reality of Taiwan’s international situation by not framing issues solely within the context of cross-Strait relations.
Ma has labelled his approach ‘flexible diplomacy’ (during the remaining years of the Lee Teng-hui administration that ended in 2000, we were used to hearing about ‘pragmatic diplomacy’), as outlined in a Presidential statement in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2008. Ma said that the ‘most important asset’ of Taiwan’s foreign policy ‘is our democracy, our way of life, our willingness to maintain cross-strait stability, and our determination to fulfil our obligations to the international community …’ He advised that Taiwan should no longer compete directly and obsessively with the PRC, but should instead strive to create a win-win relationship with Beijing. In dealing with those governments that do not recognise Taiwan, Ma said ‘we must jettison our past image of a troublemaker, refurbish our international credibility, and re-establish mutual trust with those countries.’
I present three hypotheses that are driving this research project. As yet, these are untested and I am not in a position to confirm or deny their validity. I present them here as a précis of my current interests and to solicit feedback.
- International recognition is a precondition for successful public diplomacy and soft power; it is an ‘appropriate resource’ (Lukes, 2005: 479) which can help a state meet its foreign policy objectives.
- Hard power, international recognition and therefore legitimacy trump the soft power capital of democratic values.
- Soft power is therefore only meaningful as a practical arrangement of statesmanship for governments who possess power in other areas.
So, using Taiwan as a case-study the primary objective of this research is to understand and explain how the absence of international diplomatic recognition affects the soft power and public diplomacy of “illegitimate” powers. This then requires a detailed comparison of the communications strategies designed and executed by the PRC and Taiwan to understand why, within the greater political and strategic frameworks in which they operate, one is more successful at national and international projection than the other. The research represents an attempt to unravel the paradox of democratic Taiwan’s limited success in soft power terms and the (neo-)authoritarian PRC’s apparent success.
By success I am referring to the acquisition of international attention. Because we are dealing with intangibles, it is very difficult to correlate changes in attitudes or behaviour with soft power. When we look more closely at China’s soft power and public diplomacy, we must question whether the PRC can move beyond attention-seeking and realise tangible foreign policy goals.
In the US after 911 it was common to hear Americans, including President George W. Bush, ask: ‘Why do they hate us?’ In public diplomacy terms, this immediately begs a second question in response: ‘Why don’t you ask them?’
The Chinese often ask a similar question, especially of the western media: Why do they criticise us so much? Zhao Qizheng, Director of the Foreign Affairs Committee and former director of the State Council Information Office, has often talked about the need for China to develop a soft power strategy in response to the alleged demonization by the western media and the constant chatter in some quarters about the so-called China threat. ‘This situation,’ said Zhao, ‘requires China to pro-actively establish a public diplomacy policy to improve the international image of China.’ While the idea of demonization is extremely problematic – in accepting the existence of a political conspiracy among the western media one is conveniently ignoring the differences in professional news values between Chinese and non-Chinese media and audiences – this statement is intriguing because it reveals high-level acknowledgement of the need for public diplomacy and a motive for doing so, however specious and reactive that motive may be.
The problem with most public diplomacy is that it is built from the top-down: ‘We speak, you listen.’ Few public diplomacy strategies, including the UK government’s National Security Strategy (2008) include listening as a key activity in their outreach. In the age of participatory and unmediated methods of communication – twitter, blogs, social networking sites, citizen journalism – there is no excuse for assuming that governments should speak and publics should listen. Publics want to talk too – to each other and to governments. This is valuable for public diplomacy because audiences tend to trust each other more than governments (the ‘last three feet’ in propaganda and public diplomacy – ie. personal interaction – are the most important), and because it provides for those responsible for public diplomacy a level of intelligence about public opinion their predecessors (trained perhaps in the era of the Cold War ‘hypodermic needle model’ or ‘magic bullet theory’ of communications) could not imagine: what does the world really think of you, the policies you are following and the image you are presenting? Listening to audiences also helps to tailor the message and its method of delivery according to specific social and cultural constraints.
However, first it is important to get the image right. If the question is ‘Why do they hate us?’ perhaps another satisfactory response might be: ‘Do they really know us?’ which is immediately followed by another crucial question: ‘Do we know ourselves?’ Public diplomacy must begin by understanding who ‘we’ are before we attempt to understand the audience with whom we wish to communicate.
We cannot deny that the Chinese think they know who they are: the PRC has a strong self-identity (even though it is often contradictory, hence William Callahan’s description of China as the Pessoptimist Nation (2009)); and this identity is increasingly based on power and self-confidence – the idea of Zhongguo and (inter)national recovery, rapid and widespread economic development, and increasingly (and perhaps disturbingly) a form of radical nationalism. While China’s enthusiastic embrace of soft power and public diplomacy is welcome as an alternative to the dependence on hard power, does China listen enough to a wide range of actors and institutions to understand why the international community is sometimes so critical of its actions and behaviour?
Nye has used the term ‘meta-soft power’ to describe ‘the state’s willingness to criticise itself. For Nye, such capacity for introspection fundamentally enhances a nation’s attractiveness, legitimacy and reliability’ (Watanabe & McConnell, 2008: xiii; see also Watanabe, 2006). Again, this is a useful criterion to measure China’s success (or lack of it) for the leadership in Beijing has not readily demonstrated any capacity for national self-criticism.
For Taiwan, deciding who ‘we’ are is difficult, and the design of successful public diplomacy strategies is understandably constrained by reluctance at all levels of the government to confront this issue. The particular political and strategic environments that I outlined earlier and within which Taiwan must work limit discussion about identity. How can Taiwan project an image of Taiwan until Taiwan knows what Taiwan is? Until this can be resolved internally it is difficult to conceive how Taiwan’s public diplomacy and soft power can progress.
Tentative Conclusions
The definition of soft power is contested; unless we try to de-westernise the concepts of soft power and public diplomacy, we are mired in an essentially American approach that fails to acknowledge very clear cultural differences in their understanding and application. Hence, this project requires a more nuanced analysis of soft power ‘with Chinese characteristics,’ and one might add with ‘Taiwanese characteristics.’ Although soft power works alongside hard power, it is possible to argue that a country’s location within the international system and its possession of hard power resources are still more significant than its soft power capacity. In the case-studies that inform this research project, we see how diplomatic recognition infers legitimacy and authority, and therefore provides the conditions for a more convincing source of soft power.
How should Taiwan capitalise on its two primary soft power resources, namely: (i) that it is a democracy; and (ii) it is not the PRC? One of the essential conditions is a recognition that Taiwan needs to be more pro-active in first understanding its soft power advantages, and in developing a strategy of public diplomacy that will capitalise on its advantages. One of the most disturbing observations I have made in thirteen years of researching Taiwan’s international communications is the passivity of diplomats, especially among those charged with the responsibility for selling Taiwan to the international community. In representative offices around the world there is almost a collective shrug of the shoulders: What can we do? No-one knows us, no-one cares, why should we bother? They are largely correct; few people either know or care. This means Taiwan needs to concentrate on the few who do care and do know – the last three feet – as they are possibly the opinion formers in their own country.
Moreover, Taiwan needs to decide on the Taiwan brand and ensure there is a consistent message that is centrally co-ordinated and is part of a comprehensive diplomatic strategy that is integrated with Taiwan’s foreign policy architecture. This is why it is a serious mistake to disband the Government Information Office and locate its functions within an expanded Ministry of Culture. We have seen all too clearly the effects of Washington’s decision to tear down the USIA and locate public diplomacy within the State Department. As we know, diplomacy, public diplomacy and soft power must be integrated, but they are not synonyms.
China’s challenges are different: it is not yet clear if China has the capacity to convert its public diplomacy and resources and effort into achievable foreign policy aspirations. China bestows upon its distinct approach to public diplomacy an extraordinary amount of hard and soft power – in selling Chinese language and culture; in humanitarian assistance; and in persuading its neighbours of China’s commitment to a stable, peaceful and prosperous Asia-Pacific.
China’s economic and commercial power is undeniable; and it makes China an attractive destination for global investment and entrepreneurship. However, convincing the liberal-democratic international community to look beyond trade and economics and to accept China as a credible diplomatic and strategic power is a considerable challenge for China’s public diplomacy. Cultural and economic diplomacy neither easily nor necessarily translate into foreign policy success.
The principal problems for public diplomacy are the contradictions in Chinese foreign policy. On the one hand, China yearns to be part of an independent world and to spread the benefits of political, economic and cultural engagement with China. On the other hand, Chinese political discourse is often characterised by a fierce nationalist rhetoric that is reinforced by the Communist Party’s determination to maintain authoritarian rule. Together with China’s apparently unconditional friendship with regimes considered a threat to international stability, and the use of military threat against Taiwan and Tibet, this undermines the idea that Chinese soft power is all about selling national and cultural values. Hence Taiwan – the first Chinese democracy – should be able to challenge China – an authoritarian political system – in dimensions of soft power. Why it is unable to do so is the question at the core of this research project.
References
Batora, J. (2006), ‘Public Diplomacy Between Home and Abroad: Norway and Canada,’ Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol.1.
Callaghan, W. A. (2009), China: The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford: OUP).
Chan, G. (1997), ‘Taiwan as an Emerging Foreign Aid Donor: Developments, Problems, and Prospects,’ Pacific Affairs, 70(1).
deLisle, J. (2010), ‘Soft power in a hard place: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait Relations and US Policy,’ Orbis, 54(3).
Henrikson, A. (2005), ‘Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: The Global ‘Corners’ of Canada and Norway,’ in J. Melissen (ed.), The New Public Diplomacy (New York: Palgrave).
Lukes, S. (2005), ‘Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds,’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 33(3): 477-493.
Mattern, J.B. (2005), ‘Why “Soft Power” Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies, 33 (3).
Nye, J. (2004), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Cambridge, MA.: Public Affairs).
Nye, J. (2008), ‘Forward’, in Y. Watanabe & D.L. McConnell (eds.), Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe)
Rawnsley, G. (1999), Taiwan’s Informal Diplomacy and Propaganda (Basingstoke: Macmillan)
Snow, N. (2009), ‘Rethinking Public Diplomacy,’ in N. Snow and P.M. Taylor (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (London & New York: Routledge)
Stiglitz, J.E. & L.J. Blimes (2008), The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (New York: W.W. Norton)
Watanabe, Y. & D.L. McConnell (eds.) (2008), Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe)
Watanabe, Y. (2006), ‘Revisiting Soft Power’, Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership’, http://www.cgp.org/index.php?option=article&task=default&articleid=342, accessed 26 April 2010.
Womack, B. (2005), ‘Dancing Alone: A Hard Look at Soft Power,’ in Japan Focus, available at http://japanfocus.org/products/details/1975, accessed 22 April 2010.
[1] The research will be conducted in summer 2011 during a visit to Taiwan, funded by Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fellowship Programme. During my visit I will be hosted by the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University, Taipei.
[2] As the Indian author and politician, Dr Sashi Tharoor, has claimed, hard power is exercised; soft power is evoked. Symposium on Indian Soft Power, organised by the India Media Centre, University of Westminster, 18 February 2011.
[3] ‘With its high growth rate, sectoral transformation and rise to the top echelon of global trading entities beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, Taiwan emerged as a paragon of successful development and an exemplar of the East Asian model of rapid industrialization’ (deLisle, 2010: 20).
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